Farrow v. Saint Francis Medical Center
2013 Mo. LEXIS 249
| Mo. | 2013Background
- Farrow, a registered nurse employed by Saint Francis Medical Center since 1991, developed and ran the hospital’s PICC-line program; she later moved to radiology and continued to float and earn overtime.
- In Dec. 2005 and Feb. 2006 Dr. Strange made sexual and racially charged remarks to Farrow; she rebuffed him and reported incidents to HR and department leadership, with limited action taken.
- After complaints, Farrow alleges retaliation: she was removed from performing and teaching PICC procedures, directed to train a physician’s assistant to perform them, had hours and pay reduced, and was disciplined; she transferred back to the cardiac floor in 2006 and continued to document complaints.
- Farrow was terminated in Dec. 2008 (notice cited customer service); she filed an administrative charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights in July 2009 and received a right-to-sue letter in Dec. 2009; she sued in state court in March 2010 alleging MHRA claims, retaliatory and wrongful discharge (public policy/NPA), defamation, false light, and tortious interference.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for the hospital and doctor; the Missouri Supreme Court reversed summary judgment as to MHRA sexual harassment and retaliation claims (Counts I–III) and the wrongful discharge/public-policy claim (Count V), and affirmed dismissal of Count IV (post-termination grievance retaliation), Count VI (defamation), Count VII (false light), and Count VIII (tortious interference).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of MHRA pre‑filing and right‑to‑sue | Farrow: Commission’s issuance of right‑to‑sue implies timeliness; Wyciskalla means preconditions aren’t jurisdictional limits | Defendants: Farrow’s Commission filing was >180 days after discharge and untimely; right‑to‑sue doesn’t cure lack of jurisdiction | Court: Commission’s issuance of right‑to‑sue implicitly accepted jurisdiction; defendants could and should have challenged timeliness before agency or by mandamus; Wyciskalla doesn’t bar review — reversed dismissal of Counts I–III |
| Employer exemption for religious organizations | Farrow: Hospital is subject to MHRA | Hospital: as a Catholic nonprofit it is owned/operated by a religious group and exempt under §213.010(7) | Court: regulation requiring 100% ownership and religious membership requirement is valid; nonprofit hospital cannot show ownership by a religious group — hospital not exempt; Counts I–III may proceed |
| Post‑termination grievance retaliation (Count IV) | Farrow: internal grievance retaliation is reasonably related to her administrative charge and actionable under MHRA | Hospital: claim not raised before agency; administrative charge limited to pre‑termination events | Court: charge did not reasonably encompass internal grievance process; Farrow failed to exhaust administrative remedies — summary judgment affirmed on Count IV |
| Wrongful discharge under public policy (NPA) (Count V) | Farrow: discharge was retaliation for refusing to allow non‑nurses to perform PICC lines (violating NPA/regulations); pleaded specific statutes/regulations | Hospital: pleading vague; public‑policy claim insufficiently particular; doctor not employer | Court: NPA and regulations supply a clear public policy; pleadings sufficient and factual issues exist as to motive — reversed summary judgment as to Hospital; judgment for Doctor affirmed (not employer) |
| Defamation (Count VI) | Farrow: statements harmed reputation and led to termination; damages continued through termination | Doctor: statute of limitations bar; statements published earlier than Dec. 2008 | Court: damages were ascertainable by Oct. 2006; two‑year defamation statute elapsed before 2010 suit — summary judgment for Doctor affirmed |
| False light invasion of privacy (Count VII) | Farrow: statements placed her in false light and were malicious | Doctor: tort is duplicative of defamation and not recognized; statute bar alternative | Court: Missouri has declined to recognize broad false‑light tort where claim is essentially defamation; summary judgment affirmed |
| Tortious interference with business expectancy (Count VIII) | Farrow: Doctor interfered with her employment expectancy | Doctor: as supervisor and agent of Hospital, he is not a third party and had right to criticize performance | Court: claim fails as a matter of law because Doctor acted as Hospital’s agent and had a legitimate interest — summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. banc 1993) (de novo review and summary judgment standards)
- J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009) (distinguishing jurisdictional limits from statutory preconditions)
- Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81 (Mo. banc 2010) (public‑policy wrongful discharge test articulated)
- Margiotta v. Christian Hosp., 315 S.W.3d 342 (Mo. banc 2010) (narrow construction of public‑policy wrongful discharge; pleading particularity required)
- Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri‑County, 851 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (NPA supports public‑policy wrongful discharge claim by nurse)
- Hughes v. Freeman Health Sys., 283 S.W.3d 797 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (refusal to alter patient records implicated NPA/public policy)
- Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. banc 2000) (elements of defamation)
- State ex rel. Martin‑Erb v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 77 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. banc 2002) (mandamus and administrative procedure review)
- Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. banc 2006) (when damages are ascertainable for accrual of statute of limitations)
- Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1986) (declining to recognize false‑light tort when claim is essentially defamation)