924 F.3d 1126
10th Cir.2019Background
- Charles Farrar was convicted in Colorado of multiple sexual offenses based solely on his stepdaughter’s trial testimony and was sentenced to a long prison term.
- While his direct appeal was pending, the victim recanted; Farrar sought a new trial and the trial court held evidentiary hearings but found the recantation not credible and denied relief.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial, the latter articulating a strict state-law test for new trials based on recantation (recantation must be significant new evidence and likely to be believed).
- Farrar pursued state post-conviction relief without success and then filed a federal habeas petition raising: (1) actual innocence, (2) due-process violation from false testimony, and (3) constitutional defect in the Colorado Supreme Court’s new-trial standard.
- The district court denied habeas relief; on appeal the Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo, declined to apply 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) deferential standard because the Colorado Supreme Court did not adjudicate federal constitutional claims on the merits, and affirmed denial.
Issues
| Issue | Farrar's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether actual innocence alone entitles Farrar to habeas relief | Farrar: Freestanding actual innocence should permit relief | State: Actual innocence is not a freestanding basis for federal habeas | Court: No — freestanding actual innocence does not supply habeas relief; it can only be a gateway for procedurally barred constitutional claims |
| Whether conviction based on a private witness’ false testimony violates due process | Farrar: False testimony by the victim violated due process regardless of prosecutor knowledge | State: Due-process violation requires government knowledge of falsity | Court: Requires prosecutor/govt knowledge; private perjury alone insufficient for habeas relief |
| Whether Colorado Supreme Court’s restrictive new-trial standard violated federal due process | Farrar: State court’s rule unduly restrictive and thereby deprived him of due process | State: State courts may define state-law new-trial standards; no independent constitutional violation alleged | Court: No federal violation — state-law limits on new trials do not, by themselves, create a habeasable due-process claim |
| Applicability of AEDPA deference (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) | Farrar: If applicable, would affect review | State: §2254(d) applies when state court adjudicated federal claims on merits | Court: §2254(d) does not apply because Colorado Supreme Court did not adjudicate federal constitutional claims on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (Supreme Court rejected recognition of freestanding actual innocence as basis for habeas relief)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual-innocence gateway allows overcoming procedural bars, not substantive relief)
- Napue v. People of State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prohibition on convictions obtained by government use of known false testimony)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor’s knowledge of false testimony can violate due process)
- Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (states must respect due process in appointed counsel but no constitutional right to appeal)
- Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2001) (illustrates Tenth Circuit requirement of prosecutorial knowledge for Napue claims)
- Farrar v. People, 208 P.3d 702 (Colo. 2009) (state supreme court articulating Colorado’s strict new-trial test for recantation)