FARMERS AUTO. INS. ASS'N v. Danner
967 N.E.2d 836
Ill. App. Ct.2012Background
- Farmers filed a declaratory-judgment action in Dec. 2007 seeking no duty to defend Danner and Watson because their homeowners policies allegedly do not cover intentional acts.
- Underlying Winkler lawsuit alleged battery by Danner (Counts I–III) and Watson (Counts II–IV); Winkler sought damages over $50,000.
- Policy language: Coverage E provides defense and coverage for an occurrence; occurrence is an accident; bodily injury is defined; exclusions bar coverage for injuries that are expected or intended by the insured.
- Trial court initially held no duty to defend Counts I–II but found possible duty to defend based on potential negligence, self-defense theory, and amended Counts III–IV; it allowed consideration of other pleadings per pleadings-era rules.
- Appellate court reversed, holding the trial court should determine duties to defend based on whether amended Count III alleges an accident/occurrence or an intentional act, and whether Count IV could trigger coverage via self-defense, then remanded for judgment consistent with its rulings.
- Judgment ultimately reversed with directions to grant Farmers’ summary judgment and deny Danner and Watson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Count III states an occurrence by negligence as to Danner | Danner's conduct was intentional; counts rely on the same intentional act as Counts I–II. | Count III could be a negligent occurrence; liberal construction shows potential coverage. | Count III cannot be an occurrence; no duty to defend Danner. |
| Whether Count IV triggers defense for Watson via self-defense | Policy has no self-defense exception; self-defense not covered. | Affirmative defenses may show self-defense and create a duty to defend. | No duty to defend Watson; no self-defense exception in policy. |
| May the court consider other pleadings beyond the underlying complaint | Only the underlying complaint should be considered. | Under Pekin/Wilson II, court may consider other pleadings to determine duty to defend. | Eight corners plus permissive consideration of other pleadings; duty evaluated with fuller pleadings context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill.2d 446 (2010) (self-defense exception and duty to defend analysis)
- Holabird & Root, 382 Ill.App.3d 1017 (2008) (duty to defend may consider beyond-complaint pleadings)
- Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill.2d 90 (1992) (eight-corners rule and liability coverage interpretation)
- SCR Medical Transportation Services, Inc. v. Browne, 335 Ill.App.3d 585 (2002) (consideration of allegations beyond complaint in duty-to-defend analysis)
- Dial v. Pekin Insurance Co., 355 Ill.App.3d 516 (2005) (definition of accident and unintentional consequences for coverage)
- Leverton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 289 Ill.App.3d 853 (1997) (negligence possible from self-defense allegations in duty to defend)
- Wilson II, 237 Ill.2d 446 (2010) (self-defense exception and broader duty-to-defend context)
- Northbrook Property & Casualty Co. v. Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill.2d 96 (2000) (potential coverage triggers duty to defend)
- International Insurance Co. v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill.App.3d 998 (2000) (duty to defend depends on potentially-covered allegations)
- Lexmark International, Inc. v. Transportation Insurance Co., 327 Ill.App.3d 128 (2001) (courts refuse to rely solely on labels; evaluate factual allegations)
- Carioto v. Allstate Insurance Co., 194 Ill.App.3d 767 (1990) (negligence allegations may be a device to trigger coverage)
- Dial v. Pekin Insurance Co. (State Farm context referenced), 355 Ill.App.3d 516 (2005) (accident vs intentional act analysis for coverage)