Farhane v. United States
121f4th353
| 2d Cir. | 2024Background
- Abderrahmane Farhane, a Moroccan-born naturalized U.S. citizen (naturalized 2002), pleaded guilty in 2006 to federal charges related to money laundering and false statements; he received a 13-year sentence and served ~11 years.
- In 2018 the government initiated civil denaturalization proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1451, relying on pre-naturalization conduct and Farhane’s 2006 plea admissions; denaturalization would expose him to deportation.
- Farhane filed a § 2255 habeas motion (2018) claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment because trial counsel did not advise him that his guilty plea risked denaturalization and deportation.
- The district court denied relief; a divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed; the court granted en banc rehearing.
- The en banc Second Circuit holds that Padilla v. Kentucky requires defense counsel to inform naturalized citizens when a guilty plea carries a risk of denaturalization and consequent deportation, and remands for a Strickland analysis (performance and prejudice) in the first instance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Farhane) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a naturalized U.S. citizen that a guilty plea may lead to denaturalization and deportation | Farhane: Padilla’s mandate to advise about deportation applies equally to naturalized citizens facing denaturalization leading to deportation | Gov: Denaturalization is a collateral consequence distinct from deportation; Padilla protected noncitizens only and does not cover denaturalization | Held: Yes. Under Padilla and its reasoning, counsel must at least warn naturalized citizens that a plea may carry a risk of denaturalization and deportation |
| Whether the direct/collateral distinction excludes denaturalization from Padilla’s rule | Farhane: The direct/collateral binary is ill-suited for immigration consequences; denaturalization is severe and closely tied to criminal process | Gov: Denaturalization is more remote, civil, and not typically dependent on conviction—thus collateral | Held: Padilla’s rationale controls; denaturalization (and resulting deportation risk) is sufficiently severe and enmeshed with the criminal process to trigger the duty to advise |
| Whether counsel’s silence (not affirmative misadvice) can constitute deficient performance under Strickland when immigration risk exists | Farhane: Silence about serious immigration risk violated Padilla and Strickland standards | Gov: At most affirmative misadvice is actionable; silence about collateral risks is permissible | Held: Silence can be constitutionally deficient under Padilla; failure to advise triggers Strickland analysis on remand |
| Whether Farhane is entitled to habeas relief now or whether the case must be remanded for evidentiary development and Strickland adjudication | Farhane: He would not have pled guilty if advised and was prejudiced | Gov: No prejudice; counsel reasonably lacked basis to foresee denaturalization risk; Teague retroactivity bar (for some dissenters) | Held: Remanded — district court must determine in the first instance whether counsel’s 2006 performance fell below prevailing professional norms and whether Farhane was prejudiced under Strickland; court declined to consider a forfeited Teague argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise a defendant if a plea carries a risk of deportation)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (clarifies Padilla’s scope and explains the Teague/new-rule framework)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance test: performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice inquiry in plea-context ineffective-assistance claims—whether defendant would have gone to trial)
- Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (denaturalization may follow if naturalization was illegally procured)
- Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (denaturalization is an extraordinarily severe penalty)
- Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 356 (2017) (preserving the right to remain in the U.S. can be more important to a defendant than incarceration)
- Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 330 (2017) (willfulness and materiality standards for denaturalization claims)