Fargo v. Hays-Kuehn
352 P.3d 1223
Okla.2015Background
- On July 25, 2008 a northbound truck (Kuehn) passed a stopped/slowing truck (Sankey) by entering the southbound lane; a second northbound vehicle (Merrill) followed behind Kuehn, her view blocked by Kuehn’s larger vehicle.
- After Kuehn completed the pass and moved back into the northbound lane, Merrill collided with an oncoming southbound motorcycle, killing the rider Patterson and injuring passenger Fargo.
- Plaintiffs originally sued Kuehn, Merrill, and Sankey; claims against Merrill and Sankey were dismissed without prejudice, leaving Kuehn as the sole defendant.
- The Oklahoma Highway Patrol concluded Kuehn’s inattentive passing caused the crash and recommended charges; OHP data showed Merrill braked prior to impact and Sankey’s left-turn signal was activated when struck.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Kuehn; the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding Kuehn’s conduct was at most a “condition” and not a proximate cause; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court reversed, holding disputed material facts and conflicting inferences require a jury determination on negligence and proximate cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Kuehn negligent in passing Sankey (duty/breach)? | Kuehn knew Sankey was stopped/ stopping, passed without signaling/braking, and blocked Merrill’s view — jury should decide reasonableness. | Kuehn argues her passing was reasonable under the circumstances and not unlawful as a matter of law. | Reversed: whether Kuehn acted reasonably is a jury question given disputed facts. |
| Was Kuehn’s conduct a proximate cause of injuries (cause vs condition)? | Kuehn’s pass set in motion events leading to Merrill hitting the motorcycle; OHP found a causal nexus. | Kuehn contends her actions were merely a condition, not proximate cause, because she did not collide with the motorcycle. | Reversed: proximate cause is for the jury where evidence permits reasonable causal inferences. |
| Is summary judgment appropriate given the record? | Plaintiffs: disputed facts and conflicting expert opinions preclude summary judgment. | Kuehn: no direct contact and only a “condition,” so judgment as a matter of law should be granted. | Reversed: summary judgment improper because material facts are disputed and reasonable minds could differ. |
| Does a driver owe a duty to anticipate negligence of other drivers (foreseeability)? | Plaintiffs: foreseeability of harm from passing a stopped vehicle supports imposing duty. | Dissent: duty does not extend to guarding against unforeseeable negligence of following drivers; no duty as a matter of law. | Majority: duty exists to drive with due care; scope and breach involve facts for the jury; foreseeability is factual here. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re MacFarline, 14 P.3d 551 (Okla. 2000) (summary judgment standard and heavy burden on movant)
- Union Transp. Co. v. Lamb, 123 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1942) (due care, jury’s role in negligence determinations)
- Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067 (Okla. 1995) (summary judgment improper where reasonable minds could differ)
- Wood v. Mercedes-Benz of Oklahoma City, 336 P.3d 457 (Okla. 2014) (foreseeability is central to duty scope)
- Griffeth v. Pound, 357 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1960) (drivers need not anticipate negligence of others)
- Dirickson v. Mings, 910 P.2d 1015 (Okla. 1996) (distinguishing a mere condition from proximate cause; jury question)