FARGO v. HAYS-KUEHN, 2015 OK 56

Background

On July 25, 2008 a northbound line of three vehicles (Sankey vehicle 1, Kuehn vehicle 2, Merrill vehicle 3) and a southbound motorcycle collided; motorcyclist Jason Patterson died and passenger Misty Fargo was severely injured.
Plaintiffs sued Kuehn, Merrill, and Sankey for negligence; plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed Merrill and Sankey, leaving Kuehn as sole defendant.
Facts in dispute: whether Sankey had stopped or was stopping, whether Sankey used brakes or a turn signal, and precisely what Kuehn and Merrill saw when Kuehn passed Sankey without signaling or slowing.
Agreed facts relevant to causation: Kuehn passed Sankey by crossing the centerline at highway speed without signaling; Merrill was directly behind Kuehn and had her view blocked by Kuehn’s larger truck; Merrill entered the oncoming lane to follow Kuehn and subsequently struck the motorcycle.
OHP concluded Kuehn’s inattention and failure to slow caused the collision and recommended charges against Kuehn and Merrill; plaintiffs moved forward in tort against Kuehn, who moved for summary judgment arguing her conduct at most created a condition and was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries.
Trial court granted summary judgment for Kuehn; Court of Civil Appeals affirmed; Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding proximate cause and negligence questions were for the jury.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kuehn breached duty of due care by passing Sankey without signaling/slowing	Kuehn acted unreasonably by passing a stopped/ stopping vehicle at highway speed, blocking Merrill’s view and creating the dangerous situation	Kuehn contends her actions were reasonable; she did not collide with the motorcycle and cannot be held liable for others’ negligent reactions	Breach is a jury question because disputed facts and reasonable minds could differ; summary judgment improper
Whether Kuehn’s conduct proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries or merely created a condition	Kuehn’s maneuver foreseeably caused Merrill to follow into oncoming lane and the ensuing collision	Kuehn argues her actions were only a condition, not a proximate cause, because she did not physically collide with the motorcycle and could not foresee Merrill’s conduct	Proximate cause is a jury question here; record contains evidence (including OHP finding) supporting causation, so summary judgment was erroneous
Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the record	Plaintiffs: factual disputes and conflicting inferences require a jury trial	Kuehn: undisputed facts support only one reasonable inference — her acts were not proximate cause — so judgment as a matter of law is proper	Court: summary judgment improper; view evidence in plaintiffs’ favor and let jury resolve credibility and inferences
Whether foreseeability of third-party negligence bars duty or causation	Plaintiffs: third-party reaction was foreseeable under the circumstances (blocked view, sudden pass)	Kuehn (and dissent): defendant is not required to anticipate others’ negligence; duty does not extend to unforeseeable negligent acts of follow‑vehicle	Majority: foreseeability and proximate cause remain factual issues for jury; dissent would find no duty as matter of law

Key Cases Cited

In re Macfarlane, 14 P.3d 551 (Okla. 2000) (summary judgment standard; view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067 (Okla. 1995) (proximate cause and jury questions in negligence where reasonable minds can differ)
Union Transp. Co. v. Lamb, 123 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1942) (driver’s duty of due care and jury’s role in determining negligence)
Dirickson v. Mings, 910 P.2d 1015 (Okla. 1996) (multi-vehicle collision: whether parked/lead vehicle is a condition or proximate cause is for jury)
Green v. Sellers, 413 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1966) (size of lead vehicle that blocks following driver’s view is relevant to reasonableness of passing maneuver)