FARGO v. HAYS-KUEHN, 2015 OK 56

July 25, 2008: southbound motorcycle driven by Jason Patterson struck a northbound vehicle after that vehicle entered the motorcycle's lane; Patterson died and passenger Misty Fargo was severely injured. Plaintiffs: Fargo and Patterson's estate.
Three northbound vehicles were traveling in succession: Sankey (lead, stopped/ stopping to turn), Kuehn (middle, driving a larger truck), Merrill (rear). Merrill’s vehicle struck the motorcycle; Kuehn did not physically collide with anyone.
Plaintiffs originally sued Sankey, Kuehn, and Merrill; plaintiffs later dismissed Sankey and Merrill, leaving Kuehn as sole defendant.
Disputed facts: whether Sankey had stopped or signaled, whether Kuehn observed brake/turn signals, whether Kuehn passed without braking/signaling and blocked Merrill’s view, and whether Merrill followed Kuehn into oncoming lane because of Kuehn’s maneuver.
Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) concluded Kuehn’s inattentive pass caused the sequence that led to the collision; OHP data showed Merrill braked before impact and Sankey’s left turn signal was activated at time of rear hit.
Procedural posture: trial court granted summary judgment for Kuehn; Court of Civil Appeals affirmed; Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the COA opinion, reversed trial court, and remanded for trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kuehn breached duty of due care by passing a stopped/ stopping vehicle and blocking Merrill's view	Kuehn negligently passed Sankey at highway speed without signaling/braking while Merrill followed, creating a dangerous condition and breaching duty	Kuehn says her conduct did not breach duty as she could not foresee Merrill would negligently follow into oncoming lane; leading vehicle not required to anticipate others' negligence	Issue of Kuehn's reasonableness is for the jury; summary judgment improper because facts and inferences are disputed
Whether Kuehn’s conduct was proximate cause (vs. merely a condition) of plaintiffs' injuries	Kuehn’s pass set in motion the sequence that caused the collision and thus proximately caused the harm	Kuehn argues her actions only created a condition; proximate cause absent because Merrill’s following and collision were intervening, unforeseeable acts	Proximate cause is a question for the jury where evidence permits differing reasonable inferences; summary judgment inappropriate
Whether summary judgment was proper given the record	Plaintiffs: disputed material facts and competing expert inferences preclude summary judgment	Kuehn: uncontroverted facts support only one inference (her conduct was merely a condition), so judgment as a matter of law is appropriate	Court reversed summary judgment, holding summary disposition improper where reasonable minds could differ on negligence and causation

In re Macfarlane, 14 P.3d 551 (Okla. 2000) (summary judgment standards; view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Glass, 959 P.2d 586 (Okla. 1998) (summary judgment principles)
Union Transp. Co. v. Lamb, 123 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1942) (drivers’ duty to exercise due care; jury decides reasonableness)
Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067 (Okla. 1995) (proximate cause and summary judgment; fact questions for jury)
Green v. Sellers, 413 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1966) (size of lead vehicle that blocks following driver’s view is factor in determining reasonableness)
Dirickson v. Mings, 910 P.2d 1015 (Okla. 1996) (distinguishing a condition from proximate cause is generally a jury question)