Fantus v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
1:18-cv-04389
N.D. Ga.Aug 18, 2020Background
- Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits for the period May 20, 1997–Sept. 30, 1999, alleging disabling chronic post-mastectomy pain and resulting depression/anxiety.
- Multiple ALJ hearings and two Appeals Council remands preceded a final Appeals Council denial on July 19, 2018; Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
- Treating providers (notably Dr. Carol Harpe and Dr. Mary Anne Valdecanas) completed written opinions and Dr. Harpe testified that Plaintiff could initiate simple tasks but could not sustain or complete them due to pain/fatigue.
- The Appeals Council adopted an RFC limiting Plaintiff to light work with constraints: occasional ladders, frequent postural activity, simple/routine/repetitive tasks, only occasional coworker contact, no ongoing public interaction, and low-stress work.
- The AC afforded partial or little weight to treating opinions and discounted Plaintiff’s testimony; it relied on evidence of improvement with treatment and some household/volunteer activity.
- Magistrate Judge recommended reversal and remand, concluding the AC/ALJ failed to: adequately explain discounting of treating opinions, make a clear credibility finding regarding subjective reports, and resolve an apparent conflict between the RFC (simple, routine, repetitive tasks) and DOT reasoning-level-2 jobs identified by the vocational expert.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AC properly weighed treating mental-opinion evidence (Dr. Harpe) and supported mental RFC | Harpe’s oral and written opinions show marked limits and an inability to sustain tasks; AC cherry-picked a single line and failed to give "good cause" for discounting treating opinions | AC gave partial/little weight; relied on record evidence of activity and improvement and argued it need not recite every §404.1527 factor | Remand: AC’s rationale is insufficiently particular; it failed to reconcile Harpe’s sustained‑work limitation with an RFC requiring sustained 8-hr/5-day work capacity |
| Whether AC properly weighed treating physical-opinion evidence (Dr. Valdecanas) and supported physical RFC | Valdecanas opined severe physical limits back to 1997; AC ignored/discounted those limitations without citing supporting evidence for light-RFC | AC argued Valdecanas was not a treating source for the relevant period and her retrospective opinion conflicts with objective improvement and treatment notes | Remand: AC gave little explanation tying record evidence to the adopted physical RFC; must clarify what ALJ findings it adopted and what evidence supports light work finding |
| Whether ALJ/AC properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective testimony/credibility | ALJ used boilerplate language and did not give specific reasons or tie the medical record to credibility adverse finding | Defendant says ALJ’s extensive record discussion implies a credibility determination and that medical evidence supports discount | Remand: ALJ/AC did not make an explicit or clearly implied credibility finding with specific reasons; Court cannot meaningfully review the credibility conclusion |
| Whether ALJ erred at step five: VE hypothetical and DOT conflict | Hypothetical omitted limits on concentration/persistence/pace and relied on jobs with DOT reasoning level 2 (detailed but uninvolved) that may conflict with RFC limiting to simple, routine, repetitive tasks | Defendant says "simple, routine, repetitive" and occasional coworker limits adequately capture concentration/social limits; any DOT/VE conflict is not apparent or is harmless | Remand: Because AC’s evaluation of Harpe is deficient (so exception to Winschel not shown), and because an apparent conflict exists between "simple, routine, repetitive" and DOT reasoning level 2 jobs, ALJ/AC must address and resolve the conflict on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Washington v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018) (ALJ must identify and resolve any apparent conflict between VE testimony and DOT and has an affirmative investigatory duty)
- Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to medical opinions and reasons)
- Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) (when Appeals Council grants review, council decision is the Commissioner’s final decision for judicial review)
- Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (step-five burden and use of VE testimony/Medical-Vocational Guidelines)
- Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997) (ability to perform limited everyday activities does not, by itself, disprove disability)
- Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1991) (three-part pain standard for evaluating subjective symptom evidence)