FANNIE COLLAR v. R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY
222 So. 3d 581
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Fannie Collar sued R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris in an Engle-progeny case alleging smoking caused her lung cancer/COPD.
- At trial the court excluded Collar’s treating pulmonologist’s opinion that she was addicted to nicotine (Daubert/Frye grounds), but allowed him on cross-examination to testify she could quit when "sufficiently motivated."
- Defense emphasized that Collar’s longtime treating doctor said she could quit when motivated, arguing this showed absence of addiction and that Collar’s voluntary choice, not addiction, was the legal cause of her disease.
- Defense repeated this theme in closing: addiction wasn’t a substantial contributing cause because Collar could quit when motivated; the case was about "control and responsibility."
- The jury answered “No” to whether Collar was addicted and whether addiction was a legal cause; the trial court entered judgment for defendants.
- The Fourth District reversed, finding the trial court’s inconsistent evidentiary rulings (excluding an addiction opinion but admitting related motivation testimony) unduly favored defendants and that the error was not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of treating pulmonologist’s opinion that Collar was addicted to nicotine | Dr. pulmonologist was qualified to opine on addiction based on long treatment and observations | Opinion should be excluded under Daubert/Frye as outside pulmonologist’s expertise or unreliable | Court excluded the pulmonologist’s addiction opinion (trial court ruling affirmed as basis for exclusion) |
| Permissibility of cross-exam testimony that Collar could quit when motivated | If addiction opinion excluded, related testimony about motivation should also be excluded as inseparable | Testimony about motivation is proper factual cross-examination and admissible | Appellate court held allowing motivation testimony while excluding addiction opinion was erroneous and prejudicial (reversed) |
| Prejudice / harmless error | Partial admission of motivation testimony improperly undercut plaintiff; error likely affected verdict | Any error was harmless because other evidence supported verdict (e.g., long quit periods) | Error was not harmless; defendants failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to verdict |
| Closing argument use of treating doctor’s testimony to deny addiction/legal causation | Defense mischaracterized evidence by equating motivation testimony with absence of addiction; improper emphasis given inconsistent rulings | Defense legitimately argued causation rested on Collar’s voluntary decisions and motivation | Reversal: defense exploited court’s inconsistent rulings in closing; prejudice warranted new trial (remanded) |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (gatekeeping standard for expert testimony)
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (admissibility test for scientific evidence)
- Starbuck v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1281 (expert testimony linking motivation to quit with clinical definition of addiction)
- Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251 (harmless error standard quoting DiGuilio)
- State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (harmless error analysis standard)