Family of Butts v. Constantine
491 P.3d 132
| Wash. | 2021Background
- In 2017 multiple people (including Butts, Obet, Lyles) were fatally shot by law enforcement in King County, triggering coroner’s inquests under the King County Charter.
- King County Executive Dow Constantine adopted a series of executive orders (2018, 2019, 2020 EOs) revising inquest procedures: appointing an inquest administrator, expanding public access, limiting prosecuting-attorney role, and restricting subpoenaing or compelling testimony of involved officers (later modified in 2020 EO).
- Families of the decedents petitioned for writs of mandamus to require subpoenas compelling involved officers’ testimony and to require that juries be asked whether the killings were by “criminal means.”
- Cities, the Sheriff’s Office, and officers challenged the EOs as exceeding executive authority and violating due process/appearance-of-fairness doctrines; the superior court struck down the EOs in part; the county appealed and the Families cross‑appealed.
- The Supreme Court held the Executive may adopt inquest procedures by executive order so long as they do not conflict with state law, upheld most EO provisions, but struck EO provisions that preemptively prevented the jury from getting evidence or deciding the criminal‑means question; it ordered writs compelling subpoenas for involved officers (Butts and Lyles) and requiring the criminal‑means question be presented to juries.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Executive authority to set inquest procedures | Executive orders are valid exercises of county executive power to fill statutory gaps | Orders invade judicial/quasi‑judicial territory or intrabranch discretion | Executive may establish procedures by EO so long as no direct conflict with Coroner’s Act; most EOs upheld |
| Duty to summon/examine witnesses (including involved officers) | Coroner must summon and examine “every person” with knowledge; subpoenas must be used to compel testimony | EOs lawfully limited subpoenaing/involvement of officers | Coroner (via administrator) has duty to summon/examine involved officers; subpoenas must be used when needed |
| Whether juries may determine if death was by "criminal means" | Coroner’s Act requires jury to determine means and, if criminal, who is guilty | EO language barring jury from commenting on criminal/civil liability improperly narrows scope | Jury must be allowed to determine whether means were criminal; EOs cannot preempt that question |
| Prehearing discovery & subpoena procedure | Prehearing discovery and subpoenas are necessary for fair inquests | Preinquest discovery is improper; subpoenas should be routed differently | Prehearing discovery permitted; subpoenas for production under RCW 36.24.200 must be obtained through superior court (administrator may request) |
| Scope of inquiry (policy, training, expert witnesses) | Policy, training, and expert testimony are relevant to circumstances and criminal‑means inquiry | Inquests must be narrowly limited to factbound questions, not policy/training critiques | Inquiries into policy, training, and expert testimony are permissible when relevant to circumstances and criminal‑means question |
| Appearance of fairness / delegation to at‑will administrator | Law enforcement: drafting process and at‑will administrator create appearance of bias | Executive: process was inclusive; administrators are former judges and presumed fair | Appearance‑of‑fairness challenge fails; no evidence of bias or unfair procedure shown |
| Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims | Officers: compelled testimony violates Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights | County: EOs permit counsel and preserve question‑by‑question Fifth rights; Sixth not applicable to investigative inquests | No blanket Fifth or Sixth immunity; officers may assert Fifth on a question‑by‑question basis; Sixth Amendment not triggered |
| Timeliness of inquests | Law enforcement: inquests exceeded statutory time limits | County: inquests began when Superior Court jurors were requested; stays and EO changes affect timing | Inquests here are timely under the court’s reading (BNSF); claimed untimeliness fails |
Key Cases Cited
- BNSF Ry. Co. v. Clark, 192 Wn.2d 832 (2019) (coroner must request a jury to begin an inquest; limits on preinquest inspection discussed)
- Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d 129 (1994) (Executive may promulgate inquest procedures to fill statutory gaps so long as no direct conflict)
- Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d 706 (2009) (limitation on courts interfering in intrabranch disputes; distinguished here)
- Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402 (1994) (standards for extraordinary writs such as mandamus)
- In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen, 180 Wn.2d 768 (2014) (appearance‑of‑fairness doctrine applied to quasi‑judicial bodies)
- State v. King, 130 Wn.2d 517 (1996) (Fifth Amendment assertions in noncriminal proceedings require question‑by‑question invocation)
- Jane Doe ex rel. Rudy‑Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000) (Fifth Amendment privilege in civil/noncriminal proceedings is question‑by‑question)
- Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (standards for voluntary cessation and mootness)