Faltynowicz v. Battery Park City Authority
846 F.3d 58
2d Cir.2017Background
- Battery Park City Authority (BPCA) is a New York State–created public benefit corporation charged with redeveloping Lower Manhattan; it can sue and be sued and issues its own bonds.
- Eighteen plaintiffs (9/11 cleanup workers) sued BPCA for latent respiratory injuries; many suits were dismissed for failure to serve timely notices of claim under NY law.
- The New York Legislature enacted "Jimmy Nolan’s Law" (N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50‑i(4)) to revive, for one year, certain time‑barred personal‑injury claims by post‑9/11 workers; many plaintiffs revived suits against BPCA.
- BPCA moved for summary judgment, arguing it has capacity to challenge the statute and that the revival law violates due process under the New York Constitution; the State Attorney General intervened to defend the law.
- The district court granted summary judgment to BPCA, finding BPCA independent of the State and that the statute was unconstitutional as applied; the State and plaintiffs appealed.
- The Second Circuit concluded two unsettled New York‑law questions are determinative and certified them to the New York Court of Appeals rather than resolving the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a State‑created public benefit corporation must first be shown to "be treated like the State" via a particularized inquiry before applying NY capacity‑to‑sue doctrine | BPCA: a particularized inquiry is required; BPCA is not to be treated like the State and thus can challenge state statutes | Attorney General: capacity‑to‑sue bar applies categorically to state‑created public entities; ongoing legislative control is decisive | Court: question unsettled under NY law — certified to NY Court of Appeals |
| Whether the capacity‑to‑sue rule requires the challenged statute to restrict the entity’s governmental powers | BPCA: Jimmy Nolan’s Law only affects procedural litigation prerequisites and does not restrict BPCA’s governmental powers | Attorney General: capacity‑to‑sue has been applied broadly to many state actions irrespective of whether they directly restrict governmental powers | Court: NY precedent suggests breadth of rule; unsettled application here — certified question overlaps with first issue |
| What test governs due process challenges to claim‑revival statutes under the NY Constitution: "serious injustice" (Gallewski) or "reasonableness" (Robinson) | BPCA: New York courts apply the stricter "serious injustice" standard and that standard should control | Attorney General: New York would apply the less stringent reasonableness standard | Held: NY law ambiguous; Second Circuit cannot predict which test Court of Appeals would adopt — certified to NY Court of Appeals |
| Whether Jimmy Nolan’s Law is unconstitutional as applied to BPCA under NY due process (merits) | BPCA: statute violates BPCA’s NY‑constitutional due process rights (district court agreed) | Attorney General: statute is constitutional | Held: merits unresolved because controlling state‑law questions were certified to the New York Court of Appeals |
Key Cases Cited
- Clark‑Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382 (N.Y. 1987) (public benefit corporations may be "treated like the State" for some purposes; requires particularized inquiry)
- John Grace & Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 44 N.Y.2d 84 (N.Y. 1978) (articulates consideration of instrumentality and statute in determining whether entity is treated like the State)
- City of New York v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286 (N.Y. 1995) (describes NY capacity‑to‑sue rule and four exceptions; emphasizes reluctance to intrude on state‑local political relationships)
- Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 238 N.Y. 271 (N.Y. 1924) (upheld revival statute under a "reasonableness" analysis)
- Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164 (N.Y. 1950) (articulated a "serious injustice" standard for upholding claim‑revival statutes)
- Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (N.Y. 1989) (discussed both standards in revival‑statute context and applied highest standard where met)
- Black River Regulating Dist. v. Adirondack League Club, 307 N.Y. 475 (N.Y. 1954) (held a regulating district could not challenge a legislative act; emphasized district as an agency of the State)
- Patterson v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 714 (N.Y. 1977) (addressed a parkway authority challenge to state action; opinion raises interpretive ambiguity on capacity vs. standing)
- Griffin v. Sirva Inc., 835 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2016) (sets standards for certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals)