Falcon v. State, 230 So. 3d 168

At ~6:45 a.m., a Collier County SWAT team (at least six armed deputies) executed a search warrant at Juan Falcon’s family residence based on suspected marijuana cultivation; 26 plants were later seized from a backyard shed.
Deputies were briefed that Falcon lived there with his wife and teenage children; they had no information suggesting weapons, danger, prior violent conduct, or that occupants knew of the warrant.
Deputies announced "Sheriff's Department" three times over a PA system, waited an estimated 15–20 seconds, then breached the front door with a battering ram, used two pyrotechnic noise/flash devices, and immediately restrained family members (zip-tied hands).
Trial court denied Falcon’s motion to suppress without explicit factual findings; Falcon preserved appeal of the denial, arguing knock-and-announce violation and insufficiency of probable cause.
The Second District construed the record in favor of the trial court’s ruling but reviewed the legal question de novo and concluded the 15–20 second wait was not a reasonable opportunity to respond under section 933.09.
Court reversed and ordered suppression (remanded for discharge), holding the forced entry violated the knock-and-announce statute and suppression was warranted; it declined to reach the probable-cause challenge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Falcon)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether deputies violated Florida's knock-and-announce statute by breaching the door after ~15–20 seconds	The brief wait did not give occupants a reasonable opportunity to respond; entry violated §933.09 and requires suppression	SWAT entry was reasonable given suspected grow operation and standard safety concerns; delay was sufficient	Court held the wait was unreasonable under the circumstances and entry violated §933.09; suppression warranted
Whether exigent circumstances justified immediate, forceful entry despite announcement	No exigency existed (no weapons info, family residence, early morning, occupants likely asleep)	Execution tactics justified by general safety concerns in grow operations	Court found no specific exigency to justify the rapid breach; general assumptions insufficient
Whether time of day and lack of observed activity affect reasonableness of waiting period	Early morning execution likely meant occupants asleep; no observed movement so occupants needed more time to respond	Time and tactics appropriate for officer safety and evidence preservation	Court held time of day and lack of movement supported finding that 15–20 seconds was insufficient
Whether suppression is the proper remedy for §933.09 violation	Suppression required absent exigency	State would argue suppression unnecessary because entry was reasonable	Court affirmed suppression as the proper remedy in this case

In re Doe, 932 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (appellate presumption: view facts favorably to sustain suppression denial)
Spradley v. State, 933 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (guidance on what delay is often adequate; <5s rarely, >15s often)
State v. Cassells, 835 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (discussion of reasonable opportunity to respond)
Holloway v. State, 718 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding entry unconstitutional when occupant not afforded reasonable opportunity)
State v. Cable, 51 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2010) (suppression as remedy for knock-and-announce violations)
Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964) (policy and exigency exceptions to knock-and-announce rule)
State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994) (observations on the terror of sudden, armed entry and protection of home entrance)
Richardson v. State, 787 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (occupant must have reasonable opportunity; short delays at early hours unreasonable)
Randall v. State, 793 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (ten seconds unreasonable where no indication of weapons or danger)
Pruitt v. State, 967 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (reasonable opportunity standard)
Mendez-Jorge v. State, 135 So. 3d 464 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (factors courts consider in assessing reasonableness)
Braham v. State, 724 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (hearing activity inside supports shorter delay)
Griffin v. United States, 618 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1992) (noting thirty seconds at early hour was unreasonable)