Faiupu Myers v. Checksmart Financial, LLC
701 F. App'x 588
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Myers sued after an alleged wrongful termination, filing an original complaint naming California Check Cashing Stores (CCCS). The original suit was within the statute of limitations period for her FEHA claim.
- The employer at the store bore CCCS signage, and Myers believed CCCS and Checksmart were the same entity; both used the same store address and an HR representative named "Ashley."
- Myers later filed an amended complaint naming Checksmart Financial, LLC (Checksmart) instead of CCCS.
- The magistrate judge granted Checksmart summary judgment, finding the amendment did not relate back and that Myers failed to exhaust administrative remedies under FEHA; the magistrate also awarded fees and costs to Checksmart.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, focused on whether the first amended complaint related back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) and whether Myers exhausted FEHA administrative remedies.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding the amendment related back and Myers had sufficiently identified her employer for FEHA exhaustion purposes; it declined to decide substantive merits not addressed below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the first amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) | Myers argued the amendment related back because Checksmart and CCCS were the same-operating business at the same address, same HR rep, and the failure to name Checksmart was a mistake as to proper party identity | Checksmart argued Myers knew of its existence and thus the amendment did not relate back; statute of limitations barred the claim | Reversed: under Krupski, relation-back depends on what defendant reasonably should have understood; Checksmart should have known within Rule 4(m) period Myers intended to sue it, so amendment relates back |
| Whether Myers exhausted FEHA administrative remedies by naming CCCS but not Checksmart in her DFEH charge | Myers argued naming CCCS, providing the store address, and identifying "Ashley" sufficed to identify the employer and put Checksmart on notice | Checksmart argued it was not named in the charge and thus Myers failed to exhaust administrative remedies | Reversed: identification of CCCS, the shared address, and Ashley (the HR rep) sufficiently identified Checksmart for FEHA exhaustion purposes |
| Whether the appellate court should decide substantive defenses and the award of fees | Myers argued errors in relation-back and exhaustion required reversal of summary judgment and attendant fee award | Checksmart asked the court to resolve substantive defenses in its favor and uphold fees | The court declined to reach substantive defenses (remanding for initial adjudication); because summary judgment was erroneous, the attorney’s fees and costs award was also erroneous and must be reconsidered on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010) (relation-back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) turns on what defendant reasonably should have understood about plaintiff's intent)
- Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of de novo review on certain questions)
- Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1985) (FEHA claims require exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing suit)
- Medix Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 4th 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (naming an employer or its identifiable attributes in a charge is generally required to exhaust FEHA remedies)
- Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2013) (appellate courts should not decide substantive issues the lower court did not address)