Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan
745 S.E.2d 461
W. Va.2013Background
- Western Virginia Supreme Court case interpreting a 1907 deed conveying Florence Forman's 1/7 interest in the 'surface only' of a 225-acre Preston County tract to her brother Walter Forman.
- Dispute centers on whether 'surface only' conveyed oil and gas or merely surface soil; coal rights had been severed in 1902.
- Circuit Court held the deed ambiguous under Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co. and awarded Morgan all oil and gas rights.
- Court overruled Ramage Point that 'surface' is ambiguous, instead giving 'surface' a definite meaning and holding the 1907 deed conveyed only the surface.
- Petitioners (Faith United Methodist Church and Trinity United Methodist Church) are Florence Forman’s successors and seek to recover a portion of the minerals underneath the surface tract.
- Case remanded for further proceedings to determine exact mineral interests conveyed to Florence Forman’s heirs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 'surface' in a deed is ambiguous. | Morgan relied on Ramage to treat 'surface' as ambiguous. | Petitioners argued 'surface' has a definite meaning and the deed conveyed surface only. | Ramage overruled; 'surface' has a definite meaning under ordinary construction. |
| Does the 1907 deed conveying 'surface only' include oil and gas rights beyond coal? | Morgan contends waiver of all rights except coal by 1907 deed. | Petitioners argue coal had been severed earlier and 1907 deed conveyed remaining surface rights only. | The deed conveys only surface; oil and gas rights not included unless expressly conveyed. |
| Should Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co. be overruled? | Ramage should stand as controlling law on 'surface'. | Ramage creates uncertainty and should be overruled. | Ramage Point 1 overruled; Ramage rejected as sound law; surface defined by ordinary meaning. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W.Va. 81, 118 S.E. 162 (1923) (1923) (held 'surface' ambiguous and open to extrinsic evidence)
- Williams v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 181, 43 S.E. 214 (1902) (1902) (defined 'surface' as definite and agricultural-use related in some contexts)
- Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 104 W.Va. 368, 140 S.E. 57 (1927) (1927) (recognized 'surface' may have definite meaning absent qualifiers)
- Cotiga Development Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W.Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962) (1962) (contract interpretation rules: plain language governs)
- Paxton v. Benedum–Trees Oil Co., 80 W.Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917) (1917) (extrinsic evidence not admitted to alter clear contract terms)
- Copenhaver v. United Fuel Gas Co., 110 W.Va. 69, 156 S.E. 884 (1931) (1931) (treats surface/mineral interests in context of conveyances)