798 F.Supp.3d 563
E.D. Va.2025Background
- On Aug. 19, 2025 the U.S. Department of Education placed Fairfax County Public Schools (FCPS) and Arlington Public Schools (APS) on "high‑risk" status, making federal funding "reimbursement only," based on alleged Title IX violations tied to restroom/locker‑room policies.
- Plaintiffs (Fairfax County School Board and Arlington School Board) filed emergency motions and complaints (APA and Declaratory Judgment Act) seeking preliminary injunctive/temporary relief to prevent the high‑risk designation and to compel immediate payment/restoration of federal funds.
- Plaintiffs’ requested relief is tied directly to disbursement of federal grant/formula funds; their complaints expressly seek that Defendants "immediately pay" funds and allege funding has been "effectively frozen."
- Defendants argued the Tucker Act and recent Supreme Court/Fourth Circuit decisions (notably Department of Education v. California and related post‑California stays) require claims seeking payment or restoration of federal funds to be heard in the Court of Federal Claims, not a district court.
- The Court (E.D. Va.) held that under controlling Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent it lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, denied the emergency motions, dismissed the complaints without prejudice, and denied leave for the proffered amicus brief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may enjoin a Department action and order restoration/payment of federal funds | Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief under the APA and declaratory relief; contend Grimm controls and district court can grant equitable relief | Defendants: granting relief would effectively order payment/restoration of funds and thus falls within Tucker Act/Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction | Held: District court lacks jurisdiction to order payment/restoration; Tucker Act/CFC jurisdiction governs |
| Whether Plaintiffs can avoid Tucker Act by pleading equitable/declaratory relief instead of money damages | Plaintiffs argue they did not seek "money damages," only equitable relief to compel compliance with Title IX procedures | Defendants: Plaintiffs cannot artfully plead around Tucker Act; relief sought would require disbursement of federal funds | Held: Plaintiffs may not evade Tucker Act by framing monetary relief as equitable; jurisdiction is absent in district court |
| Applicability of 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (statutory review for termination/refusal of financial assistance) | Plaintiffs invoke §1683 as a review avenue in district court | Defendants: §1683 does not override Tucker Act allocation to CFC for claims founded on contracts/entitlement to funds | Held: §1683 does not displace Tucker Act/CFC jurisdiction here |
| Whether any individual counts can be severed/saved from Tucker Act to allow district‑court adjudication | Plaintiffs urged some claims are distinct (e.g., procedural Title IX challenges) and thus non‑monetary | Defendants: claims are intertwined and centrally premised on funding consequences | Held: Claims are inextricably linked to disbursement of funds; court cannot carve out a district‑court triable subset and dismissed the entire complaints without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary‑injunction standard)
- Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (court must confirm subject‑matter jurisdiction before deciding merits)
- Dep’t of Educ. v. California, 145 S. Ct. 966 (2025) (district court likely lacked jurisdiction to order payment of money under the APA; Tucker Act/CFC governs)
- Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020) (controller Fourth Circuit precedent on transgender restroom access remains law of the Circuit)
- Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) (district courts may in some cases grant relief affecting funds, distinguished in California)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (limits on equitable relief where Congress provided a specific remedial scheme)
- Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army Bd. for Corr. of Mil. Recs., 56 F.3d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (cannot avoid Tucker Act by disguising money claims as equitable relief)
- Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Pierce, 706 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1983) (Claims Court jurisdiction cannot be avoided by framing an essentially monetary claim as equitable)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (express provision of one enforcement method suggests Congress intended to preclude others)
- Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (statutory preclusion principles for equitable relief)