985 F.3d 16
1st Cir.2021Background
- On Feb. 10, 2017 police responded to a suspicious, running Dodge Durango with Amber Fagre asleep in the front passenger seat; the driver was suspected of a violent home invasion and had a gun.
- Multiple officers (Lt. Ireland, Sgt. Estes, Chief Brown) were at the scene; Trooper Parks arrived, left to check residences, and returned about 17 minutes later to find an active exchange of gunfire and no other police vehicles nearby.
- Chief Brown fired at the fleeing suspect as he ran to and then entered the Durango; the driver fired at officers, then drove the Durango rapidly toward officers and Parks’ cruiser.
- Parks took cover on a snowbank, saw only the driver through the windshield (the passenger seat appeared empty), and fired several shots into the Durango as it sped past and struck Parks’ cruiser.
- A bullet fired by Parks passed through Amber (who was slumped and not visible) and killed her; district court granted summary judgment for Parks on federal and state claims, and the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment excessive-force / seizure | Parks seized Amber and used unreasonable, deadly force that killed her | Parks did not know Amber was in the car and reasonably used deadly force to stop an immediate threat from the driver | No Fourth Amendment violation; force was objectively reasonable |
| Objective reasonableness of force | Shooting was unnecessary; driver/car/Amber did not pose imminent danger to Parks | Driver attempted to ram Parks/cruiser at high speed and had a gun; Parks reasonably believed his life was at risk | Parks’ belief was reasonable given on-scene facts; deadly force permissible |
| Qualified immunity | Parks’ conduct was clearly unlawful and not protected | Reasonable officers could have concluded force was necessary; precedent did not clearly establish unlawfulness | Parks entitled to qualified immunity |
| State claims: MCRA and torts (negligence, wrongful death) | Violation of Maine constitutional privacy/force protections; Parks liable in tort for Amber’s death | MCRA protections coextensive with Fourth Amendment; MTCA discretionary-function immunity shields officers for objectively reasonable force | MCRA claim fails (no Fourth Amendment violation); MTCA bars tort liability because use of force was discretionary and objectively reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (explains seizure + reasonableness requirement under Fourth Amendment)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (excessive-force claims governed by Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (sets objective-reasonableness test for use of force)
- McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20 (use of deadly force justified when car could run over officer)
- Mitchell v. Miller, 790 F.3d 73 (no Fourth Amendment violation where officer fired into car that could have run him over)
- City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (qualified-immunity analysis requires closely analogous precedent)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (framework for qualified immunity and clearly established law)
- Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791 (hostage shot while officer fired into car—discusses whether shooting occupants is a Fourth Amendment seizure)