Facundo v. Almeda Genoa Houston Development LLC, 4:19-cv-02721

Plaintiff Jose Facundo, a former "working foreman" for Almeda-Genoa Construction, alleges he performed manual labor alongside supervising, regularly worked >40 hours/week, was classified salaried/exempt, and was not paid overtime.
Facundo filed an FLSA collective action seeking conditional certification of all current/former working foremen misclassified as exempt and unpaid overtime for the prior three years.
Facundo submitted his declaration and a declaration plus opt‑in consent from Antonio Farias Chagolla describing similar duties, long hours, a prohibition on recording >8 hours/day, and fear of retaliation among coworkers.
Defendant opposed conditional certification, arguing Facundo failed the minimal showing of similarly situated employees, pointing to Chagolla’s prior contradictory statements about managerial duties, and citing a separate FLSA action (Barrera) involving foremen on a prior project.
The Magistrate Judge applied the two‑stage Lusardi notice‑stage framework and its lenient standard, finding Facundo’s declarations sufficient and rejecting Defendant’s request to weigh credibility at this stage.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether to grant conditional certification under the FLSA (§16(b))	Facundo: minimal Lusardi showing met by declarations supporting existence of similarly situated foremen	Almeda‑Genoa: Facundo failed to show others likely to opt in; evidence (Chagolla) is inconsistent	Granted: court applied lenient Lusardi test and found declarations sufficient for conditional certification
Whether there is a reasonable basis that aggrieved individuals exist	Facundo: personal observations, conversations, and Chagolla declaration support existence	Almeda‑Genoa: prior Barrera litigation and lack of additional affidavits undermine that showing	Held: reasonable basis exists; minimal proof satisfied
Whether court may credit Chagolla’s declaration given alleged contradictions	Facundo: declarations are admissible and create sufficient factual basis now	Almeda‑Genoa: prior statements by Chagolla show he was managerial, undermining current declaration	Held: credibility conflicts are for later (decertification/merits); court will not weigh them at notice stage
Whether prior Barrera case precludes conditional certification here	Facundo: Barrera settlement does not decide claims in this case	Almeda‑Genoa: Barrera undercuts commonality/similarity and shows differing facts	Held: Barrera does not preclude conditional certification; any conflict can be addressed later

Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995) (discusses methods for FLSA "similarly situated" inquiry and two‑stage approach)
Hoffman‑La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1989) (district courts may facilitate notice to potential FLSA plaintiffs)
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987) (establishes two‑stage certification framework used at notice stage)
Shushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1990) (contrasts Rule 23‑style analysis with Lusardi approach)
Jones v. Cretic Energy Servs., LLC, 149 F. Supp. 3d 761 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (articulates Lusardi‑style lenient test for conditional certification)
McKnight v. D. Houston, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 794 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (courts should not make credibility determinations at the notice stage)
LaChapelle v. Owens‑Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (discusses FLSA opt‑in procedure distinct from Rule 23 class actions)