Ex parte WMS, LLC, 170 So. 3d 645

Keri D. Simms, a Jefferson County resident and Birmingham attorney, sued his former law firm (WMSLW) and four individual former members in Chambers County alleging various torts and corporate/accounting claims arising from his departure from the firm and a disputed $54,000 contingency fee from a Georgia client (his cousin, Angie Smith).
Smith’s underlying personal-injury litigation was in Troup County, Georgia; Simms consulted with Chambers County attorney Claud E. "Skip" McCoy Jr. (a nonparty) about that case while at a wedding in Chambers County in 2011. McCoy assisted as cocounsel and helped retain a Georgia firm that held the contingency fee in trust pending the dispute.
Disputes included alleged secret payments among members, withheld financial information, a negative capital-account balance claimed against Simms (~$146,834), and whether WMSLW was entitled to the Smith contingency fee following Simms’s departure in May 2012.
Simms filed in Chambers County on May 1, 2013. Defendants moved to dismiss or transfer for improper venue (and argued lack of subject-matter jurisdiction); the trial court denied the change-of-venue motion.
Petitioners sought mandamus from the Alabama Supreme Court to require transfer to Jefferson County. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding venue in Chambers County improper and directing transfer to Jefferson County.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether venue in Chambers County is proper under § 6-3-2(a)	Simms argued Chambers County was the focal point of defendants' tortious acts (e.g., communications to McCoy, use of Smith case), asserting a nexus to Chambers County	Defendants argued all parties reside in Jefferson County and the alleged acts or omissions occurred in Jefferson County (communications sent from Jefferson), so venue should be Jefferson County	Venue improper in Chambers County; transfer to Jefferson County ordered
Whether alleged communications (e-mail to McCoy) establish venue in Chambers County	Simms relied on an e-mail to McCoy and the fact McCoy is a Chambers County resident; suggested injury/climactic effect occurred there	Defendants contended the act (sending the e-mail) occurred in Jefferson County; mere receipt or possible opening in Chambers County insufficient	Court held sending occurred in Jefferson County; possible receipt/opening in Chambers County does not create venue for defamation claims
Whether mandamus relief was appropriate to correct denial of change of venue	Simms implicitly argued trial court discretion supported denial	Defendants argued mandamus was proper because they had a clear right to transfer and trial court abused discretion by denying motion	Court granted mandamus: clear legal right to transfer shown; trial court had duty to transfer where venue improper

Ex parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886 (procedural route for reviewing denial of venue via mandamus)
Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497 (mandamus standards)
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788 (review limited to trial-court record)
Ex parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458 (burden on party asserting improper venue)
Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663 So. 2d 932 (court bound by record; cannot consider new evidence)
Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089 (mandamus for venue issues)
Ex parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, 942 So. 2d 334 (venue for LLCs governed by § 6-3-2 for individuals/partnerships)
Ex parte Burr & Forman, LLP, 5 So. 3d 557 (partnership/LLC venue treated like partners' residences)
Ex parte Windom, 840 So. 2d 885 (defamation suit should be brought where statement was made, not where received)
Ex parte Canady, 563 So. 2d 1024 (venue determined as of time action filed)
Ex parte Overstreet, 748 So. 2d 194 (transfer required if venue improper at commencement)
Ex parte Townsend, 589 So. 2d 711 (forum non conveniens operates only where venue is proper)