Ex parte Weinstein, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 123

Background

Applicant was convicted of murdering Jerry Glaspie; conviction relied in part on jailhouse informant Nathan Adams’s testimony that applicant admitted strangling Glaspie and described placing the body in a trunk.
At trial Adams denied ever having auditory or visual hallucinations; defense extensively impeached Adams on criminal history, motive to lie, and cooperation with prosecutors.
Post-conviction habeas proceedings produced medical and institutional records showing Adams had a history of auditory hallucinations and psychotic reports; the habeas judge found Adams’s denial at trial was false and that the State unknowingly presented false testimony.
The habeas judge concluded Adams was a key witness on intent and that there was a reasonable probability the verdict would differ if the jury had known about hallucinations, recommending relief.
The Court accepted the factual finding that Adams’s denial was false but held the false testimony was not material because: (1) the defense had substantial impeachment evidence already; (2) much of Adams’s testimony was corroborated by independent physical and circumstantial evidence; and (3) the hallucinations reported were persecutory (not descriptive) and thus unlikely to explain Adams’s accurate, corroborated knowledge.
Legal posture: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed factual findings with deference but reviewed de novo whether the false testimony was legally "material" (i.e., reasonably likely to have affected the jury verdict).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Adams’s testimony denying hallucinations was false	Adams lied about hallucinations; medical records show auditory hallucinations	State and Adams contended denial was honest; not known to be false at trial	Held: False — records show Adams had auditory hallucinations and his denial was inaccurate
Whether false testimony was "material" (reasonable likelihood of affecting jury)	Habeas judge: Adams was key witness on confession/intent; false denial deprived defense of important impeachment; likely affected outcome	State: Extensive impeachment already presented; many Adams facts corroborated independently; overwhelming circumstantial evidence of intent	Held: Not material — court denied relief because false testimony unlikely to have changed jury verdict
Standard of review for materiality in false-testimony habeas claims	Applicant: materiality assessed under "reasonable likelihood" standard; habeas judge applied that test	State: court should review materiality de novo, deferring to factual findings	Held: Court applies de novo review to materiality but defers to factual findings supported by record
Whether unknowing use of false testimony requires different materiality standard than knowing use	Concurring view: unknowing use should require a higher materiality showing than Napue/Chapman standard due to state-action and finality concerns	Majority: applies the established "reasonable likelihood" materiality standard and examines materiality de novo	Held: Majority applies "reasonable likelihood" standard; concurrence argues for higher standard but concurs in result

Key Cases Cited

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (Sup. Ct.) (use of false testimony by prosecution violates due process)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (Sup. Ct.) (prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony and materiality standard)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (Sup. Ct.) (harmless-error/Chapman standard for constitutional error)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (Sup. Ct.) (materiality in Brady/Napue context; reasonable likelihood formulation)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (Sup. Ct.) (harmless-error standard for federal habeas review)
Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Texas materiality standard: reasonable likelihood that false testimony affected conviction)
Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App.) (discussing Napue standard and materiality for knowing use of false testimony)