Ex Parte Patricia Foster Skelton, 434 S.W.3d 709

Background

Patricia Foster Skelton, a former county attorney, was convicted by a jury for forging a deceased client Ysidro Canales’s will (altering a writing and filing a photocopied version without disclosing alterations). Intent to defraud or harm was the central issue at trial.
The State’s investigation involved Texas Ranger Coy Smith, who searched Skelton’s office and testified that Skelton invoked her Miranda rights and retained counsel during the interview.
At trial, the State presented evidence suggesting Canales could not have executed the will on the alleged date; defense theory was that the filed document accurately reflected a valid will and Skelton’s credibility was central to that defense.
After conviction, a civil probate jury later found the probated will valid and that Skelton did not forge the will — a conflicting civil outcome relied on by Skelton in her habeas filings.
Skelton sought habeas relief under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072 while on community supervision; the habeas court denied relief as frivolous, but on remand conducted an evidentiary hearing and made findings.
The court of appeals concluded Skelton’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) allowing testimony that she invoked Miranda rights and emphasizing it on cross-examination, and (2) failing to object to a Texas Ranger’s opinion testimony implying her guilt; these deficiencies prejudiced her defense, so the conviction was vacated and habeas relief granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Skelton)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Skelton invoked Miranda rights	Counsel’s failure permitted prejudicial evidence that invited an adverse inference and undermined Skelton’s planned exculpatory testimony	State did not contest merits on appeal; trial counsel defended his choices as strategic	Counsel performed deficiently by allowing and later emphasizing Ranger Smith’s testimony that Skelton invoked rights; prejudice shown
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Ranger Smith’s expert/opinion testimony that Skelton was guilty	Such opinion testimony invaded the jury’s role and Ranger Smith was not qualified to opine on guilt or the Penal Code elements	State again did not press merits; trial counsel argued question was about a forged filing, not guilt	Counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to Ranger Smith’s opinion of guilt as expert-formatted testimony; contributed to prejudice
Whether other alleged failures (hearsay bolstering, improper jury argument, theory expansion) established ineffective assistance	Some such errors further tainted the trial; civil verdict created actual-innocence support	State argued no reversible error on theory expansion; habeas court found counsel credible and strategic	Court rejected some claims: expansion-of-theory and some rebuttal argument objections would likely have been overruled; hearsay bolstering (casino records) was “backdoor hearsay” but counsel’s post-trial strike and impeachment strategy supported reasonableness
Whether Skelton is entitled to habeas relief based on actual innocence (Schlup-type claim)	Civil probate verdict that the will was valid is new evidence making conviction unlikely and supports relief	State did not substantively brief this on appeal; court reviewed de novo	Schlup gateway inapplicable to first-time state habeas under art. 11.072; habeas court correctly denied Schlup-type claim as frivolous; relief granted on ineffective assistance grounds only

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (applicant must prove ineffective assistance by preponderance; analyze totality of representation)
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (ineffective-assistance standards and deference to counsel’s strategic decisions)
Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (objections to evidentiary matters must be shown to be meritorious when alleging ineffective assistance)
Hardie v. State, 807 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (use of a defendant’s invocation of rights after Miranda is impermissible evidence)
Boyde v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (witnesses may not give opinions on defendant’s guilt)
Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (inadmissible evidence that permeates trial and undermines credibility can demonstrate prejudice)