Ex Parte Moussazadeh
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 356
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- Applicant pled guilty to murder without a sentencing agreement and was sentenced to 75 years; plea accepted by trial court.
- On direct appeal, the Houston Court of Appeals affirmed; habeas corpus relief was denied in Moussazadeh II prior to this reconsideration.
- Applicant later filed a second habeas corpus application alleging trial counsel gave erroneous parole guidance that rendered the plea involuntary.
- This Court sua sponte reconsidered Moussazadeh II and granted relief, dismissing Moussazadeh III, and vacating the judgment.
- Key issue: whether counsel’s incorrect parole-eligibility advice renders a guilty plea involuntary, and the proper scope of applicable parole-law precedents.
- The Court concluded that parole-eligibility misadvice can render a plea involuntary and ordered a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does erroneous parole guidance render the plea involuntary? | Moussazadeh II misapplied; misinformed parole advice could render the plea involuntary. | Previous standards should remain; parole guidance is speculative and not an essential plea term. | Yes; relief granted; counsel deficient and plea involuntary. |
| Must parole eligibility be an essential element of the plea to render it involuntary? | Parole eligibility is integral to the bargain and thus essential. | Not required; focus on voluntariness of plea and counsel’s advice generally. | Not required; misadvice concerning parole can render plea involuntary regardless of essential-element status. |
| Should Evans and Moussazadeh II be disavowed for the involuntary-plea analysis? | Against reliance on those precedents. | Keep the existing framework. | Yes; those decisions are overruled to the extent they require parole-eligibility to form an essential element. |
| What is the correct distinction between parole eligibility and attainment for due-process purposes? | Eligibility and attainment are distinct; misstatements about eligibility are actionable. | Attainment is more speculative and should govern. | Clear distinction; eligibility is determinable by the law at offense time and is the proper focus for misadvice analysis. |
| Does the standard for habeas relief under Strickland apply when parole-misadvice affects voluntariness of a plea? | Strickland applies; deficient performance undermines reliance on plea. | Unchanged standards apply as to collateral review. | Applied Strickland; deficient performance plus prejudice shown; relief granted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (parole-eligibility misstatement previously deemed non-determinative; overriden here)
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 64 S.W.3d 404 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (parole-eligibility and attainment distinctions emphasized; later overruled)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (ineffective assistance standard for guilty pleas)
- Ex parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (plea voluntariness and counsel performance framework)
- Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (Strickland standard applied to habeas context)
- Ex parte Thompson, 173 S.W.3d 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (parole-eligibility timeframe tied to offense date governs eligibility)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (inference-based analysis in habeas practice context)