Ex Parte Mary S. Roberts
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 8773
| Tex. App. | 2013Background
- Mary Roberts was convicted of five counts of theft by coercion/deception for participating in an extortion scheme with her husband; some extorted payments were routed as checks to a children’s charity the couple controlled.
- At sentencing the court probated ten-year concurrent sentences, assessed 400 hours of community service, and the judgments reflected $0 restitution; the jury was instructed Roberts was not charged with crimes against any charity.
- Three years later the trial court modified Roberts’s community-supervision terms to mirror her husband’s, ordering Roberts to pay $70,000 jointly and severally to a charitable corporation (the court described it as restitution to a charity).
- Roberts appealed the modification (dismissed for want of jurisdiction) then sought habeas relief challenging the $70,000 payment; the habeas court denied relief and Roberts appealed.
- The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court had authority to impose the $70,000 payment either as restitution or as a payment “related personally to [Roberts’s] rehabilitation.” The court concluded the trial court lacked authority and ordered deletion of the restitution condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Roberts) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court could order $70,000 restitution to a charity not charged or victimized in Roberts’s convictions | Court lacked authority because restitution may be ordered only to victims of the offense; charity was not a victim of the crimes for which Roberts was convicted | The modification was permissible as restitution because funds were extorted under guise of charitable donations | Held for Roberts: restitution may be ordered only for victims of the offense; charity was not a victim here, so restitution unlawful |
| Whether the court could add restitution to community supervision three years after sentencing | Roberts argued the court could not add restitution later because it was not imposed at sentencing | State conceded modification to add restitution later was improper but relied on alternate basis (rehabilitative payment) | Court found it unnecessary to decide fully because restitution to an unrelated charity was improper; also agreed later addition would be improper per precedent |
| Whether the $70,000 payment could be imposed as a payment “related personally to defendant’s rehabilitation” under art. 42.12 §11(b) | Roberts argued the order was restitution in intent and, in any event, the payment isn’t related to rehabilitation | State argued the payment could be characterized as rehabilitation-related (reform purpose) because charity payments address the nature of the offense | Held for Roberts: payment was not related personally to rehabilitation—no connection to services or treatment that would reduce recidivism—so the statutory exception did not apply |
| Remedy: whether habeas relief should have been granted to delete the payment condition | Roberts sought deletion of the restitution condition from her supervision terms | State opposed relief | Court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant habeas relief and delete the $70,000 restitution condition |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (restitution is a form of punishment intended to redress wrongs for which defendant was convicted)
- Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (trial court may order restitution only to victims of the offense charged)
- Busby v. State, 984 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (specific statute subsection limits broader authority to impose conditions of community supervision)
- Bailey v. State, 171 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (restitution must be tied to the criminal conduct for which defendant was convicted)
- Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (trial court may not add a restitution order after sentencing if it was not imposed in open court at sentencing)
- Vento v. State, 724 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987) (example of probation condition requiring defendant to pay for a rehabilitation program directly tailored to the offense)