Ex Parte L.C.
02-16-00365-CV
Tex. App.Sep 28, 2017Background
- Appellant L.C. was arrested for misdemeanor family-violence assault in August 2015 and charged by information.
- The State and L.C. entered a district-court–approved diversion memorandum of agreement (DMA) that imposed conditions (no new offenses, drug/alcohol abstinence and testing, reporting to a case manager at the county department, batterers-intervention program (BIP), fees, no contact with complainant, etc.) and promised dismissal upon successful completion; no guilty plea was required.
- L.C. completed all DMA requirements, including the BIP, and the trial court dismissed the information at the State’s request based on that completion.
- L.C. petitioned to expunge arrest records under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(ii) (expunction when charge dismissed because the person completed an authorized pretrial-intervention program under Gov’t Code § 76.011); the State opposed, arguing the DMA was not an authorized pretrial-intervention program.
- At the hearing, county administrator’s office witness Debra Bezner testified the county contracts with the Community Supervision and Corrections Department (the department) to administer DMA functions, and the department supervises participants under the court’s direction; trial court denied expunction, reasoning the DMA was not a statutory pretrial-intervention program because the department did not itself operate the program as a "state-based" entity.
- On appeal the court reviewed the statutory interpretation question de novo and concluded the DMA qualified as an authorized pretrial-intervention program because the department performed the supervisory functions required by Gov’t Code § 76.011.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court-approved DMA administered with county involvement qualifies as an "authorized pretrial-intervention program" under art. 55.01(a) and Gov’t Code § 76.011 | L.C.: DMA is an authorized pretrial-intervention program because the department performed supervisory functions required by § 76.011 and the dismissal followed completion | State: DMA is not authorized because the department did not "operate" the program directly (county/admin office ran it); programs must be state-based/operated by the department | Court: DMA qualifies as an authorized pretrial-intervention program as a matter of law because the department performed the supervisory/operational functions required by § 76.011; expunction required |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte K.R.K., 446 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014) (discusses statutory nature of expunction relief)
- Barker v. State, 84 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002) (burden on petitioner to prove statutory entitlement to expunction)
- Heine v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (distinguishes mandatory versus discretionary expunction provisions)
- In re J.O., 353 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011) (trial court has no discretion when article 55.01(a) conditions are met)
- Ex parte Scott, 476 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (statutory interpretation governs scope of pretrial-intervention-based expunction)
- Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Nail, 305 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010) (addresses standard of review for statutory questions in expunction cases)
- State v. N.R.J., 453 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014) (examines trial-court discretion and legal-error as abuse of discretion in expunction context)