Ex Parte Justin River Carter, 03-14-00669-CR

Background

Justin River Carter was indicted for one count of terroristic threat under Tex. Penal Code § 22.07(a)(4) (intent to impair public service) and § 22.07(a)(5) (intent to place the public or a substantial group in fear) for online posts: “I think I’ma SHOOT UP A KINDERGARTEN AND WATCH THE BLOOD OF THE INNOCENT RAIN DOWN” and “AND EAT THE BEATING HEART OF ONE OF THEM.”
Carter filed pretrial motions: motion to quash, motions to dismiss (vagueness and First Amendment), and an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking facial and as-applied relief from § 22.07(a)(4) & (5).
Trial court denied the motions and declined the habeas application; Carter filed an interlocutory appeal.
State argues (1) pretrial habeas cannot be used to adjudicate as-applied First Amendment claims where post-conviction appeal is adequate, (2) Carter waived Texas constitutional claims by inadequate briefing, and (3) the terroristic-threat provisions are neither facially overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague and the statements are unprotected true threats.
Key factual/contextual points for the State: the posts were not conditional or political hyperbole, were made in the context of recent school shootings, elicited fear from a witness who reported to police, and Carter continued to post disturbing language after hostile reaction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Use of pretrial habeas to raise as-applied First Amendment challenge	Carter: pretrial habeas can vindicate his speech rights as applied to him	State: as-applied challenges must be preserved for trial/post-conviction appeal; pretrial habeas is improper	Court: pretrial habeas may address facial challenges but not as-applied First Amendment claims when adequate appeal exists
2. Waiver of Texas constitutional claims	Carter: prosecution violates both federal and Texas constitutional free-speech/due-process protections	State: Carter failed to separately brief Texas constitutional claims and thus waived them	Court: Texas-constitutional claims inadequately briefed and waived
3. Facial overbreadth of §22.07(a)(4) and (a)(5) (terms: “public service”, “substantial group of the public”)	Carter: terms are vague/overbroad and chill protected speech	State: statutes target true threats/intentional conduct; overbreadth must be substantial and Carter bears burden; ordinary meanings suffice	Court: statute presumed valid; no substantial overbreadth or fatal vagueness shown; terms reasonably understandable
4. Whether Carter’s statements are protected political hyperbole or unprotected true threats	Carter: posts were sarcastic/hyperbolic and not true threats	State: context, content, and reaction show serious expression of intent to commit violence—true threats are unprotected	Court: statements constitute true threats (not protected); State may criminalize them

Key Cases Cited

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true-threat doctrine permits states to proscribe serious expressions of intent to commit violence)
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (political hyperbole may not be a true threat; context and audience reaction are crucial)
United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001) (threats communicated to third parties can be true threats; context matters; rejecting proposed jury instruction requiring direct communication to the target)
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (overbreadth doctrine requires a realistic danger the statute will substantially inhibit protected speech)
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (content-based restrictions on protected speech trigger heightened scrutiny)
State v. Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (facial challenge standard: challenger must show the statute always operates unconstitutionally)
Long v. State, 931 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (vagueness/First Amendment context; specificity in threat element helps avoid vagueness problems)