230 So. 3d 783
Ala.2016Background
- Child born June 17, 2013; mother (J.B.) had divorced D.W. in June 2012; child was conceived after divorce. Mother placed the child for adoption two days after birth; adoptive parents filed adoption petition June 19, 2013 and listed the father as "unknown."
- D.W. (mother’s ex-husband) had an ongoing relationship with mother during pregnancy: attended prenatal visits, provided financial support, was publicly associated with mother, obtained a marriage license with her, and they filed a joint 2012 tax return.
- Mother allegedly told D.W. the child died shortly after birth (giving a false death certificate); D.W. learned the child was alive only after being contacted about the adoption and then moved quickly to contest.
- D.W. did not register with the Alabama Putative Father Registry within 30 days of birth; adoptive parents argued this failure created irrevocable implied consent to adoption under the PFRA and the Adoption Code.
- Probate court tried threshold issue of whether D.W. and mother were common-law married; court granted judgment on partial findings that no common-law marriage existed and dismissed D.W.’s contest for lack of standing, then granted adoption.
- Court of Civil Appeals partially reversed, holding D.W. had preserved a constitutional due‑process argument that his prebirth conduct created a protected opportunity-interest to contest the adoption; Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (D.W.) | Defendant's Argument (Adoptive parents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.W. preserved a constitutional due‑process claim that his prebirth conduct created a protected interest to contest the adoption | D.W. argued at trial that his prebirth commitment and postbirth actions entitled him to constitutional protection to object to adoption even if PFRA would otherwise bar him; counsel invoked Lehr and Due Process | Adoptive parents argued D.W.’s trial argument was too vague and did not identify statutes or specific as‑applied challenges, so the constitutional issue was not preserved | Supreme Court held D.W. did not sufficiently preserve a specific constitutional challenge in the probate court; issue was not properly before Court of Civil Appeals, so that court’s judgment reversing on that basis was reversed and remanded |
| Whether a common‑law marriage existed making D.W. a presumed father under Adoption Code §26‑10A‑7 | D.W. presented evidence (cohabitation, public holding out, marriage license, prenatal involvement) supporting common‑law marriage | Adoptive parents argued evidence was insufficient; summary-judgment motion and JMOL sought on that issue | Probate court found no common‑law marriage; Court of Civil Appeals and Supreme Court deferred to probate court’s ore tenus factfinding; Supreme Court’s decision focused on preservation and reversed the Court of Civil Appeals’ constitutional‑preservation holding |
| Whether failure to register with the Putative Father Registry (PFRA) barred D.W.’s contest | D.W. argued fraud by mother (false death), prompt contest once aware, and prebirth conduct prevented implied consent; thus PFRA should not be applied to deprive him of rights | Adoptive parents argued PFRA and Adoption Code require registration and create irreversible implied consent if not timely filed | Supreme Court did not decide merits of PFRA’s application here; addressed only preservation—held appellant failed to specifically present an as‑applied constitutional challenge below, so appellate reversal on that ground was improper |
| Whether appellate court erred by remanding for probate court to determine constitutional opportunity‑interest | D.W. claimed Court of Civil Appeals correctly remanded to assess his prebirth opportunity‑interest | Adoptive parents argued remand relied on an unpreserved constitutional claim | Supreme Court reversed Court of Civil Appeals because it based its judgment on an unpreserved constitutional argument and remanded that court for proceedings consistent with the opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (United States Supreme Court) (discusses constitutional protection for putative fathers who timely protect parental interests)
- Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (United States Supreme Court) (parents’ rights in care, custody, and nurture of children)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (United States Supreme Court) (standard and protection in parental‑rights termination contexts)
- Ex parte Toyota Motor Corp., 684 So.2d 132 (Ala. 1996) (standard of review on certiorari from Court of Civil Appeals)
- M.V.S. v. V.M.D., 776 So.2d 142 (Ala. Civ. App.) (Alabama appellate recognition of Lehr principles)
- Alabama Power Co. v. Turner, 575 So.2d 551 (Ala. 1991) (requirements for preservation of constitutional issues on appeal)
- Ex parte J.W.B., 933 So.2d 1081 (Ala. 2005) (deference to ore tenus findings by probate/trial courts)