228 So. 3d 1008
Ala. Civ. App.2017Background
- Cantrell (plaintiff) sued Hibbett Sporting Goods for workers’ compensation benefits after an on-the-job injury in Indiana; he lived in Lamar County, Alabama when he sued.
- Hibbett Sporting Goods moved to transfer venue to Jefferson County, submitting an HR affidavit stating its principal place of business was in Jefferson County and that it did not do business in Lamar County.
- Cantrell opposed, arguing venue was proper in Lamar because Hibbett Team Sales (a related company) acted as Hibbett Sporting Goods’ agent in Lamar; he submitted company materials and affidavits showing Hibbett Team Sales sold to Lamar County schools.
- Hibbett Sporting Goods submitted competing affidavits asserting Hibbett Team Sales operates independently and there is no agency relationship; the trial court denied the transfer.
- Hibbett Sporting Goods petitioned for mandamus; the appellate court reviewed whether Hibbett made a prima facie showing that Lamar County was improper venue and whether Cantrell rebutted that showing by proving an agent relationship under Ala. Code § 6-3-7(a)(3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue in Lamar County is proper under § 6-3-7(a)(3) (corporation sued in plaintiff's county if corporation does business by agent there) | Cantrell: Hibbett Team Sales acted as Hibbett Sporting Goods’ agent in Lamar County, so defendant ‘does business by agent’ there | Hibbett: Hibbett Team Sales is a separate, independent subsidiary that does not act as Hibbett Sporting Goods’ agent in Lamar County | Court: Hibbett made a prima facie showing venue was improper; Cantrell failed to show Hibbett Team Sales was Hibbett Sporting Goods’ agent for venue purposes, so transfer to Jefferson was required |
| Whether Jefferson County is a proper forum under § 6-3-7(a)(2) (county of corporation’s principal office) | Cantrell: (no dispute) | Hibbett: principal office is in Jefferson County | Court: Jefferson County is proper under § 6-3-7(a)(2) |
| Whether the “catch-all” § 6-3-7(a)(4) applies | Cantrell: argued venue in Lamar via agency; alternatively not argued that (4) applies | Hibbett: (a)(2) applies so (4) irrelevant | Court: (4) inapplicable because (2) provides proper venue |
| Whether district court properly considered defendant’s late affidavits | Cantrell: affidavits were untimely under Ala. R. Civ. P. 6(d), should be excluded | Hibbett: trial court allowed affidavits; consideration was within discretion | Court: trial court did not exceed discretion; appellate court considered affidavits |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Peabody Galion Co., 497 So.2d 1126 (Ala. 1986) (agency for venue focuses on whether entity is the ‘means’ by which defendant does business in county)
- Ex parte Charter Retreat Hosp., Inc., 538 So.2d 787 (Ala. 1989) (reiterates venue-agency ‘‘means’’ test; control is not dispositive)
- Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So.2d 1089 (Ala. 2002) (standards for mandamus review of venue transfer and ‘‘does business’’ analysis)
- Ex parte Adams, 11 So.3d 243 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (workers’ compensation venue governed by § 6-3-7)
- Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So.3d 940 (Ala. 2011) (§ 6-3-7(a)(4) is a catch-all only if (1)-(3) do not apply)
- Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So.2d 1071 (Ala. 1999) (‘‘does business’’ means performing business functions with some regularity in the county)
- Ex parte SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa, N.A., 619 So.2d 1356 (Ala. 1993) (sale of a corporation’s products can constitute doing business)