Ex Parte George Glynn Banta, 09-20-00290-CR

In November 2020 George Glynn Banta was arrested on a warrant and charged with continuous sexual abuse of three daughters (alleged conduct from Nov. 2014–Nov. 2020); offense is a first‑degree felony with a 25–99 years or life sentencing range and ineligibility for parole.
The trial court set bail at $250,000. Two weeks later Banta moved to reduce bail to $10,000 (later seeking $15,000 at the hearing), asserting he could not afford the surety bond premium.
Banta submitted a sworn statement claiming limited cash ($49) and listing a $105,000 house, but omitted key details (benefit amounts, bank accounts, mortgage status); he and his brother testified at the reduction hearing.
At the hearing the State summarized investigative evidence (forensic interviews, family outcries, detailed allegations) and argued the bond was warranted by the seriousness of the allegations and danger to the community; the State called no witnesses.
The trial court denied the reduction motion. On appeal Banta argued the $250,000 bond was excessive; the court applied article 17.15 factors and the abuse‑of‑discretion standard and affirmed, finding Banta failed to prove inability to secure funds or that the bond was oppressive.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the $250,000 bail is excessive and should be reduced	Banta: cannot afford the premium for a $250,000 surety bond; can post bail if reduced to $10,000–$15,000; submitted sworn statement	State: bail reasonable given continuous sexual‑abuse allegations, danger to victims/community, severe potential punishment; record lacks evidence Banta exhausted resources or sought bonds	Court: Affirmed. Trial court did not abuse discretion — Banta failed to prove inability to obtain funds or that bail was an instrument of oppression

Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (defendant bears burden to show bail is excessive)
Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (purpose of bail is to assure appearance; not to oppress)
Ex parte Bufkin, 553 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (bail should not be used as instrument of oppression)
Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (review of bail‑reduction rulings under abuse‑of‑discretion standard)
Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (factors courts consider in setting bail)
Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (trial court may disbelieve defendant’s affidavit/testimony on ability to pay)
Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (additional considerations in bail setting: ties, work record, past bonds)
Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (trial court’s implied findings may be relied on when no written findings requested)
Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (defendant must demonstrate inability to secure bail or assistance)
Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (affirming substantial bail where defendant provided only vague asset evidence)
Esquivel v. State, 922 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (seriousness of sexual‑offense charges is a relevant bail consideration)