537 S.W.3d 109
Tex. Crim. App.2017Background
- Applicant was charged with causing serious bodily injury to a child (Tex. Penal Code § 22.04(a)(1)); State later abandoned the deadly-weapon allegation.
- Applicant pleaded guilty under a plea deal with a 50-year cap; trial court sentenced him to 50 years.
- Applicant alleged his plea was involuntary because his second attorney misadvised him about how a deadly-weapon finding would affect parole eligibility; he said he would have insisted on trial if properly advised.
- Habeas court found Applicant’s ineffective-assistance and involuntariness claims credible and recommended relief; findings are supported by the record.
- The central legal question: whether, under controlling federal precedent at the time Applicant’s conviction became final, he is entitled to relief for counsel’s alleged misadvice about parole eligibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Evans) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether erroneous advice about parole eligibility can support ineffective-assistance claim in plea context | Bad advice prejudiced plea decision; reasonable probability he would have gone to trial | Argues Hill does not establish that parole-misadvice can be constitutionally deficient and that any new rule should not be retroactive | Court applied Hill/Hill‑style Strickland prejudice test and granted relief; vacated judgment and remanded custody to county sheriff to answer indictment |
| Whether Hill v. Lockhart controls retroactivity here | Hill provides the governing ineffective-assistance framework for pleas and requires showing reasonable probability of different outcome | State contends Hill did not decide that parole-misadvice can ever be deficient; thus Moussazadeh III is a new rule not entitled to retroactivity | Majority treated Hill as controlling for the prejudice inquiry and concluded relief appropriate under precedent available when conviction became final |
| Whether Moussazadeh III’s rule (parole misadvice can be ineffective assistance when not an element) is retroactive | Evans relies on Moussazadeh III and earlier state precedent to support retroactivity | State argues Teague non-retroactivity concerns and reliance on Moussazadeh II counsel the opposite result | Majority applied applicable federal precedent to grant relief; concurrence and dissent debated retroactivity but court granted relief |
| Whether plea record showed parole eligibility was an affirmative plea term | Evans asserts counsel’s misadvice was material regardless of record silence because it affected plea choice | State relies on Moussazadeh II principle that parole eligibility must be an affirmative element to usually merit relief | Court found habeas findings credible and, applying Strickland/Hill, concluded prejudice and afforded relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (ineffective assistance framework for guilty pleas: must show reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, defendant would not have pleaded guilty)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part standard for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (retroactivity doctrine for new rules on collateral review)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (U.S. 2013) (discussion of when a decision announces a new rule for retroactivity purposes)
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (state court ruling recognizing circumstances in which parole-misadvice can constitute ineffective assistance)
- Ex parte Moussazadeh, 64 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (earlier state precedent on parole eligibility as an element of plea agreements)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1803) (establishing U.S. Supreme Court as ultimate authority on federal constitutional law)