563 S.W.3d 239
Tex. Crim. App.2018Background
- In 1987 John and Sally Sweek were murdered; a mark on John's forearm was identified at trial as a human bitemark and a partial left-thumb print from Chaney was found in the apartment. No eyewitnesses.
- Chaney was indicted, tried twice (first trial mistrial), convicted of John Sweek's murder in 1987, sentenced to life and a $5,000 fine; conviction affirmed on appeal.
- State's case was largely circumstantial but heavily relied on forensic odontology testimony that Chaney was the biter (Hales and Campbell) and Hales' "one-in-a-million" statement and wound‑timing testimony; other evidence included equivocal shoe/blood testing, Chaney statements, and Hilton's testimony about motive.
- Post-conviction developments: scientific literature and ABFO standards evolved to disavow bitemark individualization; Hales changed some opinions; DNA testing and investigative follow-up produced exculpatory and impeachment material (shoe tests, searches with no blood, Hilton's inconsistent statements, alternative suspects linked to drug-deal network).
- Chaney filed habeas alleging (1) new scientific evidence undermining bitemark comparisons (Art. 11.073), (2) conviction secured by false evidence, (3) Brady violations, and (4) actual innocence. State and habeas court agreed relief was warranted; the Court granted relief and set aside the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether changed scientific knowledge about bitemark analysis warrants post-conviction relief under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.073 | Chaney: bitemark science has evolved; individualization and probabilistic claims are discredited; newer ABFO standards would exclude the trial testimony, so, under art. 11.073, he would not have been convicted | State: concedes bitemark science changed and that Hales could not testify as at trial; argues other evidence exists but acknowledges bitemark no longer proves guilt | Granted under Art. 11.073: new science unavailable at trial would be admissible now and, by preponderance, would have prevented conviction because bitemark evidence was central |
| Whether the conviction was obtained by use of false evidence (wound-age and probability testimony) | Chaney: Hales' "one in a million" statistic and the timing testimony were false/misleading; Hales knew the literature did not support his probability claim and changed wound-age opinion without disclosing the basis | State: no meaningful defense to falsity given record; court treats investigating officers as State for Brady/false-evidence analysis | Granted: court adopts habeas findings that the testimony was false or misleading and was material to the conviction |
| Whether the State suppressed Brady material (undisclosed negative shoe test, undocumented search with no blood, Hilton's inconsistent statements) | Chaney: State withheld favorable impeachment/exculpatory evidence that would have discredited key forensic and witness evidence and undermined State's theory | State: ultimately conceded many points in post-conviction investigation and issued a Brady notice acknowledging undisclosed material | Granted: suppressed evidence was favorable and, considered collectively, material—undermining confidence in verdict |
| Whether Chaney is "actually innocent" based on newly discovered evidence | Chaney: new science, DNA exclusions, suppressed evidence, witness recantations/inconsistencies, and new suspects establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would convict | State: agreed with habeas court that Chaney is entitled to relief and, after investigation, supported the conclusion of innocence | Granted: weighing new evidence against trial record, court finds by clear and convincing evidence no reasonable juror would convict; judgment set aside and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (standard for freestanding actual-innocence claims: clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would convict)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (false-evidence/related habeas jurisprudence)
- Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (due process violated when conviction is obtained using false evidence; materiality standard)
- Robbins v. State / Ex parte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Article 11.073: "scientific knowledge" includes changed expert knowledge)
- Ex parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Brady materiality assessed collectively; suppressed evidence may undermine confidence in outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (Brady principles: State includes investigators; suppressed evidence must be considered collectively)