Ex parte Chaddock
2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 859
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2012Background
- Applicant challenge: aggravated assault conviction (cause F-0401705-RE) after being convicted of greater offense engaging in organized criminal activity (cause F-0485746-K).
- Two indictments arise from July 26, 2004: one for organized criminal activity with alleged aggravated assault as member of a gang; another for aggravated assault as a lesser offense.
- Trial: jury convicted the organized-criminal-activity charge and sentenced to 19 years; later the applicant pled guilty to the aggravated-assault charge and received 10 years.
- Texas Court held that pursuing the lesser offense after conviction for the greater offense violates Double Jeopardy.
- Court vacates the lesser offense judgment and dismisses the indictment with prejudice.
- Major issue centers on whether Section 71.03(3) permits successive prosecutions for engaging in organized crime and a lesser included predicate offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blockburger controls sameness in successive prosecutions | Garza permits continued prosecution despite same elements due to legislative intent. | Hunter/legislative intent allows successive prosecutions under two statutes despite sameness. | Blockburger governs sameness; Section 71.03(3) unconstitutional as applied. |
| Whether legislative intent can authorize successive prosecutions for same offense | Legislature intended to permit separate prosecutions under 71.03(3). | Hunter shows legislature may authorize cumulative punishment but not successive prosecutions; Dixon undermines broader doctrine. | Legislative intent cannot authorize successive prosecutions for same offense; relief granted. |
| Whether Dixon and Hunter create inconsistent interpretations of double jeopardy | Dixon different contexts do not undermine Hunter’s approach. | Dixon supports using Blockburger uniformly; legislative intent not to override double jeopardy. | Court adopts Blockburger with legislative-intent override; finds 71.03(3) unconstitutional. |
| Whether the lesser-included offense should be barred after conviction for greater offense | Constitutional protection bars prosecuting the lesser after greater is proven. | Garza allows concurrent or successive prosecutions depending on context. | Bar applies; second prosecution for aggravated assault barred. |
| What is the appropriate remedy and disposition | Vacate lesser offense conviction and dismiss related indictment with prejudice. | Maintain or modify as required by double jeopardy analysis. | Applicant entitled to relief; judgment vacated and indictment dismissed with prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (not same offense for multiple-punishments; section override via 71.03(3))
- Dixon v. United States, 509 U.S. 688 (U.S. 1993) (same-offense test unified across contexts; Blockburger standard applied)
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1983) (legislative intent can authorize cumulative punishment in single trial)
- Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (U.S. 1977) (greater offense subsumes lesser offense for double jeopardy purposes)
- In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (U.S. 1889) (greater-inclusive offense bars subsequent lesser-included prosecution)
- Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1996) (conspiracy vs. continuing-crime offenses; legislative intent consideration)
- Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (U.S. 1990) (earlier same-conduct approach rejected in Dixon)
- Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (U.S. 1977) (greater crime conviction bars lesser crime when necessary to prove offense)