Ex parte Barnaby, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1169

Background

In 2009 Barnaby was arrested after officers found a small plastic bag containing suspected crack; DPS lab analyst Jonathan Salvador later reported it contained cocaine.
Barnaby pled guilty in a package deal to four possession-with-intent-to-deliver charges (all enhanced as habitual) and received four concurrent 50-year sentences.
Salvador was later discovered to have engaged in "dry-labbing" and other laboratory misconduct; DPS investigations led to his suspension/termination and raised questions about many cases he handled.
Following Ex parte Coty, Barnaby filed habeas relief arguing Salvador’s report was false and that the falsity rendered his plea involuntary.
The habeas court found an inference of falsity under the Coty protocol; the State conceded falsity here and did not rebut it.
The central dispute became materiality: whether the false lab report affected Barnaby’s decision to plead guilty (i.e., would he have insisted on trial if he had known the report was false?).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Standard to assess materiality of false evidence in guilty-plea context	Barnaby: materiality should be judged by whether the false evidence probably affected his decision to plead (a "but-for" test akin to Hill/Strickland prejudice for pleas).	State: adopt the plea-ineffective-assistance "but-for" standard (reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial).	Court: Agreed — materiality measured by whether, had defendant known evidence was false, he would have insisted on trial.
2. Whether an inference of falsity may be raised against a lab technician with a pattern of misconduct	Barnaby: Coty protocol permits inferring falsity when technician is state actor, committed multiple intentional misconducts, worked the case, misconduct could affect evidence, and timing overlaps.	State: must be allowed to rebut; but conceded falsity here.	Court: Applied Coty factors, found they were met and accepted inference of falsity; State presented no rebuttal.
3. Whether Salvador’s false report rendered Barnaby’s plea involuntary	Barnaby: The lab report’s falsity deprived him of material information and thus made his plea unknowing and involuntary.	State: Even if report false, the plea bargain’s benefits (disposition of three other cases, waiver of drug-free-zone findings, reduced parole consequences) outweighed value of knowing report was false.	Court: Denied relief — by preponderance, plea benefits outweighed the falsity; Barnaby would not have insisted on trial.
4. Appropriate remedy when false evidence induced a guilty plea	Barnaby: New trial for the affected count(s).	State: No relief necessary because plea was voluntary in light of package deal and concessions.	Court: No new trial; relief denied.

Key Cases Cited

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (guilty plea waives several constitutional rights and must be voluntary)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970) (plea must be knowing and voluntary with awareness of relevant circumstances)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (applies Strickland prejudice standard to guilty pleas: but‑for effect on plea decision)
Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (protocol to infer falsity from a lab technician's pattern of misconduct)
Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (state's use of material false evidence violates due process)
Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (applying Hill/Strickland framework to plea-voluntariness challenges)