Ex Parte: Andrew Pete, 05-15-01521-CR

Background

Appellant was convicted by a jury on three counts of aggravated sexual assault; he elected (or attempted to elect) jury assessment of punishment and testified during the punishment phase.
While approaching the witness stand the jury observed Appellant in shackles; defense moved for a mistrial, which the trial court took under advisement.
The trial court later granted a mistrial limited to the punishment phase only and discharged the jury; it then set a new punishment hearing.
Appellant filed a combined habeas application and motion to reinstate pretrial bond arguing the court lacked authority to grant a mistrial limited to punishment and that the case should be returned to its pre-trial posture.
The trial court (different judge) denied relief; the court of appeals reversed, holding a mistrial generally renders prior proceedings legally ineffective and returns the case to its pre-mistrial status.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether, under Texas’s bifurcated guilt/punishment system, a trial court may grant a mistrial limited to the punishment phase when error or misconduct affects only punishment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Pete)	Held
Whether a trial court may grant a mistrial limited to the punishment phase when irremediable error occurs only during punishment	Trial courts have inherent authority to limit a mistrial to punishment; nothing in the Code or rules forbids it and bifurcation supports limiting relief to punishment	A mistrial necessarily returns the case to its pre-trial status (vacating guilt and punishment); thus a limited mistrial as to punishment only is not authorized	Court held a trial court may grant a mistrial limited to the punishment phase in appropriate cases, rejecting the unitary-era rule that a mistrial always wipes the entire proceeding clean
Whether a defendant’s statutory right to have “the same” jury assess punishment bars a limited mistrial	The limited mistrial is permissible unless it violates a defendant’s validly asserted right to the same jury; statutory scheme allows limiting relief where appropriate	Limited mistrial infringes the statutory right to have the same jury assess punishment (Article 37.07 §2(b)) and thus is impermissible absent an express exception	Court recognized the statutory right to the same jury can constrain a limited mistrial but is not an absolute bar; exceptions exist (e.g., defendant forfeiture, invited error, or failure to timely invoke the right)
Whether Appellant preserved the claim or invited the limited mistrial (procedural default/invited error)	State contended Appellant either invited the limited mistrial or failed to timely invoke his right to jury punishment, so he cannot complain	Pete argued trial court mischaracterized scope and he did not consent to a punishment-only mistrial; he sought relief via habeas	Court concluded the record showed Appellant failed to timely invoke the right to the same jury and, critically, invited the limited mistrial (did not object when court characterized the motion as punishment-only), so he cannot obtain relief

Key Cases Cited

Bullard v. State, 331 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (unitary-era statement that after a mistrial the case returns to its pre-mistrial status)
Hight v. State, 907 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (pre-Rule 21.9 holding regarding limits on trial courts granting new trials solely on punishment)
Rodriguez v. State, 852 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (trial court may rescind a granted mistrial while viable)
State v. Davis, 349 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (post-amendment recognition that a trial court may grant a new trial on punishment alone)
Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (invited error/estoppel precludes complaining about action a party requested)
Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (background on the purpose of bifurcation and historical practice)