537 S.W.3d 122
Tex. Crim. App.2017Background
- Aguilar, a Honduran national with Temporary Protected Status (TPS), pleaded guilty to a state-jail felony (attempted evading arrest) and received a six‑month sentence.
- Aguilar was seeking adjustment to lawful permanent resident status and instructed his immigration attorney to advise his criminal plea counsel.
- The immigration attorney told plea counsel a felony conviction would make Aguilar ineligible for TPS renewal and for adjustment to permanent residency, and would expose him to removal.
- Plea counsel told Aguilar and the immigration attorney he understood and would follow that advice, negotiated a plea he believed complied, but incorrectly advised Aguilar the plea had no adverse immigration effect.
- After conviction, USCIS informed Aguilar his TPS reapplication would be denied because of the felony; the habeas court found the conviction will terminate his TPS and render him removable.
- Aguilar filed post‑conviction habeas alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) causing an involuntary plea; the court vacated the plea on that ground.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Padilla v. Kentucky apply where a guilty plea automatically causes loss of nonimmigrant status (TPS) that in turn renders the defendant presumptively removable? | Padilla applies because the plea produces an automatic loss of status that makes removal practically inevitable. | Padilla is limited to convictions that directly and clearly produce deportability; loss of TPS is not immediate removal. | Padilla extends to convictions that automatically trigger loss of status which, in turn, render the defendant presumptively removable. |
| Did plea counsel perform deficiently by giving incorrect immigration advice after consulting the immigration attorney? | Counsel was told by the immigration attorney the consequences, assured he understood and would rely on that advice, but nevertheless misadvised Aguilar. | Counsel relied on immigration counsel and had no duty beyond advising of general risk where consequences are uncertain. | Counsel’s performance was deficient: he guaranteed reliance on the immigration counsel’s clear advice but negotiated and advised incorrectly. |
| Did Aguilar satisfy Strickland/Hill prejudice (i.e., would he have gone to trial but for the bad advice)? | Aguilar and counsel affidavits show he would have refused the plea and insisted on trial if correctly advised. | State argued harm not shown or that prejudice standard differs from habeas harm standard. | Court found the habeas judge’s credibility findings credible and held Aguilar met the Hill/Strickland prejudice showing. |
| Appropriate remedy/timing: should relief await actual termination of TPS or deportability? | Relief is proper because the conviction automatically triggers status loss and presumptive removal, making the plea involuntary now. | Court should wait until TPS is actually terminated or other intervening events occur before granting relief. | Court vacated the plea; concurrence accepts result on equivalent grounds; dissent would defer until status termination and disputes some harm‑standard statements. |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (attorney must give correct advice when deportation consequences of a plea are clear)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard for IAC claims affecting guilty pleas)
- Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (Hill standard governs prejudice under Padilla)