Ewing v. Isaac, 3:22-cv-01009

Background

Plaintiff Anton Ewing sued Isaam Isaac for alleged TCPA, CIPA, and CLRA violations based on 14 robocalls/texts between June 12–July 2, 2022.
Plaintiff filed the complaint July 12, 2022; process server left papers with an office manager and mailed documents to a Honolulu address on July 22–25, 2022; Plaintiff filed a Declaration of Mailing and sought entry of default on August 15; the clerk entered default on August 16 and Plaintiff moved for default judgment the same day.
Defendant Isaac filed a declaration denying proper service: a person posing as FedEx left a package at a business office, the office manager was not informed of its contents and was not authorized to accept service, and Isaac was personally served only on August 23, 2022.
The Court found Plaintiff’s proof of substituted service deficient under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 415.20/417.10 (missing statements re: diligence and that the person was informed of the papers) and that any substituted service would have made the 21‑day response period expire after the clerk entered default, so the default was premature and void.
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s Rule 55(c)/Rule 60(b) framework, the Court also found no culpable conduct, a plausible meritorious defense (jurisdiction/standing/participation challenges), and no prejudice to Plaintiff from vacatur.
Result: Court GRANTED Defendant’s motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default, VACATED the default, DENIED Plaintiff’s default judgment motion as moot, and ordered Defendant to respond by December 30, 2022.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was service of process proper before the clerk entered default?	Service was made by substituted service at Defendant’s office and by mail (per Plaintiff’s Declaration of Mailing).	Service was improper: papers left at business, office manager not authorized or informed, and personal service occurred only later.	Service was not shown to be proper; substituted-service proof lacked required statements, so default was void/premature.
Was the clerk’s entry of default premature?	Default was valid after the claimed substituted service and mailing.	Even if mailed July 25, substituted service would make service effective Aug 4, so deadline to respond ran past Aug 16—default premature.	Default was premature because the 21‑day response window had not yet expired when default entered.
Do the Rule 55(c) / Rule 60(b) "good cause" factors support vacating default?	Plaintiff did not meaningfully contest the factors.	Defendant: no culpable conduct; has meritorious defenses (lack of jurisdiction, failure to state claim, non‑participation); vacatur would not prejudice Plaintiff.	All three factors favored vacatur (no culpability, plausible defenses, no prejudice); court granted set aside.
Should Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be granted?	Plaintiff sought default judgment based on the clerk’s default.	Defendant opposed and moved to set aside default.	Denied as moot because default was vacated.

Key Cases Cited

Mendoza v. Wight Vineyard Mgmt., 783 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1986) (district courts have broad discretion to set aside defaults)
TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (defendant bears burden to show good cause to vacate default; culpability/meritorious defense/prejudice test applies)
Franchise Holding II, LLC v. Huntington Rests. Grp., Inc., 375 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (same good‑cause standard for vacating entry of default and vacating default judgment)
Direct Mail Specialists v. Eclat Computerized Techs., 840 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (law favors deciding cases on the merits; doubts resolved in favor of vacating defaults)
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988) (conduct is culpable if defendant had notice and intentionally failed to answer)
United States v. Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (low threshold for alleging a meritorious defense on a motion to set aside default)
Floveyor Int’l, Ltd. v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. App. 4th 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (proof of service by registered process server creates a rebuttable presumption if statutory requirements met)
Evartt v. Superior Ct., 89 Cal. App. 3d 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (plaintiff bears burden to show reasonable diligence before substituted service)
Rodriguez v. Cho, 236 Cal. App. 4th 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (two or three attempts at personal service usually sufficient to show reasonable diligence)