Evillo Domingo v. Marsha Kowalski
810 F.3d 403
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- Special-education teacher Marsha Kowalski was accused by a classroom aide (Suzanne Brant) of abusive techniques during 2003–2004: gagging a nonverbal student (R.G.) with a bandana and restraining him; strapping another student (J.J.) to a toilet for toilet-training; leaving a third student (N.D.) on a training toilet in view of classmates; and using face‑grabbing/force to gain attention.
- Kowalski defended these acts as misguided but pedagogically motivated attempts to toilet‑train students and control disruptive behavior; some practices were tied to IEP goals.
- Brant reported concerns late in the year; supervisors had limited notice (one therapy supervisor complained after observing N.D. on a toilet; earlier complaints were sparse and general).
- Multiple investigations (police, county services, Ohio Dept. of Education) produced no criminal charges; the Dept. of Education resolved with a consent agreement requiring coursework; Kowalski was suspended with pay then later reassigned and not given an unsupervised classroom.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process) and state tort claims; district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding conduct improper but not conscience‑shocking; Sixth Circuit affirmed as to § 1983 claims and thus affirmed dismissal of supervisory/Monell claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kowalski's conduct violated students' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights ("shocks the conscience") | Kowalski's toilet‑training, restraints, gagging, and attention‑focusing methods were abusive, demeaning, and violated bodily integrity | Actions were pedagogically/disciplinarily motivated attempts to toilet‑train and control severe special‑education behaviors and therefore not conscience‑shocking | Court: No constitutional violation — conduct related to legitimate pedagogical aims, not sufficiently brutal, malicious, or injurious to "shock the conscience" |
| Whether Kowalski's supervisors were deliberately indifferent (supervisory liability) | Supervisors had notice or should have had notice and failed to act | Supervisors lacked sufficient notice of the full scope of conduct to be deliberately indifferent | Court: Summary judgment for supervisors — prerequisite constitutional violation not proved; alternatively insufficient notice |
| Whether North Point is liable under Monell for policies/practices that permitted abuse | North Point's policies/training allegedly created environment enabling abuse | North Point's policies and training were not constitutionally inadequate; no underlying constitutional violation | Court: Monell claim fails because no underlying Fourteenth Amendment violation shown |
| Whether plaintiffs proved "serious injury" (physical or psychological) necessary to show due‑process violation | Psychological injury or harm to dignity from the conduct suffices; disabled nonverbal children may suffer unexpressed harms | No evidence of serious physical or psychological injury; lack of parental complaints and no proof of distress | Court: No evidence of serious injury here; absence of injury contributes to finding no constitutional violation |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1998) (only the most egregious official conduct shocks the conscience)
- Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980) (framework for assessing corporal punishment by school officials)
- Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987) (students’ right to bodily security; malicious non‑disciplinary conduct can violate due process)
- Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2001) (factors: pedagogical justification, excessiveness, intent, serious injury)
- T.W. v. School Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010) (abusive conduct may nonetheless be disciplinary if related to legitimate school objectives)
- Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) ("shocks the conscience" standard applies in school‑student cases)
- Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. of Harlan Cty., Ky., 118 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997) (conduct must be severe and disproportionate to violate due process)