29 F.4th 206
4th Cir.2022Background
- Evens Julmice obtained an immigrant visa as an "unmarried son" of a U.S. citizen despite being married; he misrepresented his marital status and became removable.
- Julmice sought a discretionary waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I) (waiver for an alien who "is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen").
- An Immigration Judge denied the waiver, relying on Board precedent (Matter of Federiso) that a deceased parent cannot qualify; the Board affirmed and declined to revisit Federiso.
- Julmice challenged that interpretation; the Board had not addressed the Ninth Circuit decision rejecting Federiso.
- The Fourth Circuit applied Chevron step one and held the statute’s text does not impose a living-parent requirement: in ordinary English a person remains the "son" or "daughter" of a deceased parent.
- The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for the agency to exercise its discretion on waiver eligibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I) requires the referenced parent to be currently living | Julmice: statute’s plain text does not require a living parent; a child remains the son/daughter of a deceased parent in ordinary English | Government/Board: statute is silent; Board precedent (Federiso) requires a living parent; policy favors keeping living families together | Court: No living-parent requirement in the statute; statutory text controls, so remand for discretionary consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (Chevron deference to agency interpretations)
- Federiso v. Holder, 605 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ninth Circuit rejected Board’s living-parent requirement)
- Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (ordinary-language interpretation guidance)
- Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) (text controls over policy arguments)
- Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) (limits on reading statutory silence as agency authorization)
- EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489 (2014) (example of statutory silence where Chevron step two may apply)
- Babcock v. Kijakazi, 142 S. Ct. 641 (2022) (contextual comparison of statutory language)
- Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (Chevron framework application)