Evans v. State, 23 A.3d 223

Evans was convicted on Count Nine for obliterating the manufacturer’s mark on a firearm under § 5-142 (2003) of the Public Safety Article.
Section 5-142 lacked an internal penalty provision and had no related penalty reference in § 5-143.
Historically, the prior regime treated the obliteration offense under a penalty that later became associated with a related statute; the current wording orphaned § 5-142 from a penalty.
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Count Nine conviction; this Court granted certiorari to decide whether § 5-142 can sustain a criminal conviction without a penalty.
The Court held that the absence of a penalty provision renders § 5-142 incapable of criminalizing the conduct, requiring reversal of Evans’s Count Nine conviction.
Legislative history showed the omission resulted from an inadvertent omission during recodification, and the Court declined to repair that omission.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 5-142 lack a crime due to no penalty provision?	Evans: no penalty means no crime.	State: penalties can be implied from related provisions.	Yes; § 5-142 has no penalty, so it cannot criminalize the conduct.
Can § 5-143 serve as the penalty for § 5-142 without explicit linkage?	Evans: no direct cross-reference; not a crime.	State: reconcile via broader statutory scheme.	No; the statutes are not harmonized to create a single crime.
Is the presumptive possession language in § 5-142(b) sufficient to criminalize obliteration under § 5-142?	Evans: presumptive possession evidences the crime.	State: presumptive language does not place the act under § 5-143’s crime.	No; presumptions are evidentiary, not the same crime as § 5-143.
May legislative history fill the gap and cure the omission?	Evans: history shows intent to penalize obliteration.	State: cannot rectify an omission by interpretation.	No; Graves v. State prohibits treating inadvertent omissions as correctable.
What is the appellate remedy for Evans’s Count Nine?	Evans: reversal of Count Nine is required.	State: likely need remand with directions.	Judgment reversed as to Count Nine; case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 803 A.2d 518 (Md. 2002) (penalty reads with conduct under par materia when recodified)
LaFave, Criminal Law § 1.2(d) (2010) (textual treatise cited on two-part crime requirement)
Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 639 A.2d 675 (Md. 1994) (read the statute with implied penalties in certain reconciliations)
Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 978 A.2d 736 (Md. 2009) (statutory interpretation framework emphasizing legislative purpose)
Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 772 A.2d 1225 (Md. 2001) (court cannot correct omissions in statutory language)
Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525 (Md. 1857) (presupplies that presumption and statutory alignment are not the same as the crime)
Street v. State, 307 Md. 262, 513 A.2d 870 (Md. 1986) (prohibits penalties from curing lack of crime in absence of penalty)
Chen v. State ( Gun Violence Act history ), — (Md. 2002) (historical linkage of penalties to firearm provisions)