Evans v. State
2016 Ark. 377
| Ark. | 2016Background
- In 2003 Marcus D. Evans was convicted (bifurcated trial) of aggravated robbery, theft, and being a felon in possession; sentenced as a habitual offender to 300 months and restitution; conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
- In August 2016 Evans filed pro se to reinvest jurisdiction so the trial court could consider a writ of error coram nobis and moved to subpoena evidence alleging misidentification.
- Evans alleges the State and police concealed witnesses who gave “suspect identification” and that the victim’s identification was false or manufactured, asserting a Brady violation.
- Trial testimony: victim Charles Savage identified Evans and described a prolonged carjacking in which Evans threatened him with a gun and fired shots; SUV was later recovered burned.
- Evans points to inconsistent descriptions (hair style, street name) and to prior statements at a 2002 revocation hearing suggesting other witnesses existed who linked Evans to a suspect description.
- The Supreme Court reviewed whether Evans pleaded a ground sufficient to warrant permission to pursue coram nobis (an extraordinary, rare remedy requiring extrinsic, fundamental error).
Issues
| Issue | Evans' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether to reinvest jurisdiction to pursue coram nobis based on alleged Brady violation | State withheld witness IDs and identification information that would have impeached the victim and altered outcome | Allegations are conclusory and lack particularized proof of withheld, material evidence | Denied — allegations insufficient to show withheld, material, prejudicial evidence or reasonable probability of different result |
| Whether alleged withheld witness names/identifications meet Brady materiality | Withheld names/witness statements would have allowed impeachment and subpoenas to challenge ID | Evans knew in 2002 that persons had identified him; no specific proof of concealment or materiality | Denied — no substantiation that evidence was hidden or that nondisclosure was material and prejudicial |
| Whether purportedly false testimony at trial (officer/victim) establishes coram nobis | Trial witnesses lied or contradicted prior reports; State knew and used false testimony | No proof State knowingly used false testimony; false-testimony claims alone do not establish fundamental error for coram nobis | Denied — mere allegation of false testimony does not warrant coram nobis without proof State knowingly used it |
| Whether sufficiency/credibility issues justify coram nobis | Inconsistencies in descriptions and credibility show innocence and undermine verdict | Sufficiency and credibility are for trial/direct appeal, not coram nobis | Denied — coram nobis is not a vehicle to relitigate sufficiency or credibility issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady materiality standard; reasonable probability test)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (defining reasonable-probability test for undisclosed evidence)
- Newman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 61 (coram nobis reinvestment requirement; extrinsic-fact burden)
- Isom v. State, 462 S.W.3d 662 (Brady standard and evaluation in coram-nobis context)
- Lacy v. State, 377 S.W.3d 227 (Brady and materiality principles applied)
- Westerman v. State, 456 S.W.3d 374 (strong presumption of validity for convictions in coram-nobis proceedings)
- Johnson v. State, 460 S.W.3d 790 (requiring materiality and prejudice for undisclosed evidence)
- Pinder v. State, 474 S.W.3d 490 (false-testimony allegations insufficient for coram-nobis without proof)