Evans v. Freedom Healthcare
311 Neb. 336
| Neb. | 2022Background:
- Plaintiff Warren Evans received platelet-rich plasma (PRP) knee injections at Freedom Healthcare in February 2018; procedure performed by a physician assistant who drew/centrifuged his blood and injected both knees.
- Evans developed worsening right-knee pain the next day, was hospitalized with a polymicrobial septic knee infection, underwent multiple surgeries, and alleged the infection was caused by the clinic’s breach of sterile technique.
- Defense evidence (Dr. David Brown) characterized post‑injection joint infection as rare (estimated 1:3,000–1:50,000) and consistent with an inherent, though uncommon, risk of intra-articular injections.
- Plaintiff’s expert (Dr. Scott Swanson) testified that a polymicrobial joint infection of this type is not seen absent a significant breach of sterile technique and opined such a breach violated the standard of care; he also acknowledged lacking information about the clinic’s specific sterility protocols.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Freedom Healthcare, concluding plaintiff lacked competent expert proof and that res ipsa loquitur did not apply; the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pleading specific negligence bars invocation of res ipsa loquitur at summary judgment | Evans: res ipsa is an evidentiary rule and may be pleaded alongside specific negligence; should be considered at summary judgment | Freedom: pleading specific negligence precludes res ipsa | Court: Reversed district court — res ipsa may be considered; pleading both is permitted at this stage |
| Whether plaintiff produced adequate expert evidence to create a triable issue on breach of standard of care | Swanson’s opinion that infection could not occur absent a significant sterile breach creates a genuine issue | Defense: Swanson’s testimony was inconsistent/insufficient; Brown showed care met the standard | Court: Swanson’s testimony was not inconsistent and was sufficient to raise a material factual dispute |
| Whether res ipsa loquitur applies so negligence can be inferred at summary judgment | Evans: infection unlikely absent negligence; instrumentality under clinic control; no explanation given — res ipsa elements met | Freedom: infections, though rare, can occur as a known risk; res ipsa inappropriate | Court: Evidence permissibly supports each res ipsa element for reasonable jurors; res ipsa inference should go to factfinder |
| Whether the court may weigh expert credibility/competing evidence on summary judgment | Evans: court must view evidence and reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, not weigh experts | Freedom: district court weighed perceived inconsistencies and credited defense expert | Court: Court must not weigh evidence at this stage; it should determine only whether reasonable persons could find for plaintiff |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. Lasting Hope Recovery Ctr., 308 Neb. 538, 955 N.W.2d 707 (appellate summary judgment standard)
- Lombardi v. Sedlacek, 299 Neb. 400, 908 N.W.2d 630 (expert testimony normally required in medical‑malpractice to create material fact)
- Hemsley v. Langdon, 299 Neb. 464, 909 N.W.2d 59 (elements of medical malpractice claim)
- Anderson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 295 Neb. 785, 890 N.W.2d 791 (res ipsa is a rule of evidence, not a pleading bar)
- Keys v. Guthmann, 267 Neb. 649, 676 N.W.2d 354 (situations where negligence may be inferred under res ipsa)
- McLaughlin Freight Lines v. Gentrup, 281 Neb. 725, 798 N.W.2d 386 (at summary judgment, court must not weigh evidence when evaluating res ipsa applicability)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (standards for admissibility of expert testimony)
- Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (Nebraska guidance on expert testimony admissibility)
- Roberts v. Weber & Sons Co., 248 Neb. 243, 533 N.W.2d 664 (elements of res ipsa loquitur)
- Long v. Hacker, 246 Neb. 547, 520 N.W.2d 195 (res ipsa permits inference of negligence when facts speak for themselves)
