346 S.W.3d 313
Mo. Ct. App.2011Background
- Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that section 393.1050 is invalid in light of Missouri’s Renewable Energy Standard.
- Proposition C (Nov. 2008) created the Renewable Energy Standard but did not include 393.1050, which was enacted in 2008 and became effective before Proposition C.
- Section 393.1050 exempts certain utilities meeting renewable standards from parts of Proposition C.
- Appellants alleged (1) GA lacked authority to amend before voters adopted Proposition C, (2) irreconcilable conflict with Proposition C, (3) unconstitutional special law favoring Empire.
- Trial court dismissed, holding PSC had primary jurisdiction over Empire and 393.1050’s application.
- Appellants appealed the dismissal Challenging PSC’s jurisdiction and the statutory framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court had statutory authority to proceed. | Evans argued PSC must decide statute validity first. | Empire/PSC argued PSC has primary jurisdiction over interpretation and application. | Yes, PSC has primary jurisdiction; circuit court lacked authority to decide first. |
| Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies before the PSC was required. | Appellants claim exhaustion is unnecessary to challenge a statute’s validity. | PSC must determine provisions of Proposition C and related statutes before court review. | Appellants failed to exhaust before PSC; dismissal proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009) (two types of jurisdiction; subject matter vs. personal; exhaustion not jurisdictional in Webb)
- McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. banc 2009) (redefines primary jurisdiction as statutory right to proceed)
- Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. banc 1991) (describes doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies)
- Fortenberry v. Buck, 307 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (pre-trial dismissal possible when affirmative defense apparent)
- State ex rel. Sprint Missouri, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Missouri, 165 S.W.3d 160 (Mo. banc 2005) (PSC interpretation afforded deference; PSC’s role in statutory interpretation)
- Green v. City of St. Louis, 870 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. banc 1994) (exhaustion principles cited in administrative regulation context)
- Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. banc 1972) (agency interpretation given weight in statutory scheme)
- Treaster v. Betts, 324 S.W.3d 487 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (affirms that exhaustion may be raised as affirmative defense)