Evan J. Hodge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 45A03-1701-CR-111

On Dec. 19, 2014, Martin Joshua arrived at the Foster residence after being shot multiple times; he staggered in and told bystanders "Tay-Tay killed me," a nickname for Evan Hodge. Emergency responders found Joshua in severe distress; he later died from an abdominal gunshot wound.
Police found a running silver Jaguar outside the house, two shell casings nearby, and items (cigar tips, cigarette butt, saliva) with DNA consistent with Hodge at the scene.
Hodge was charged with murder, carrying a handgun without a license, and adjudicated a habitual offender; the jury convicted and the court sentenced him to an enhanced term totaling 85 years.
At trial the State introduced Joshua’s out-of-court statements identifying Hodge as the shooter (over defense hearsay objections) as dying declarations, and admitted two police reports (over an objection that they were duplicative).
On appeal Hodge challenged: (1) admission of Joshua’s statements as dying declarations; (2) admission of two police reports as hearsay/fundamental error; and (3) sufficiency of the evidence to prove knowing or intentional murder.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Joshua's statements as dying declarations	Statements were admissible because Joshua’s wounds, conduct, and statements showed he believed death was imminent	Statements were hearsay and inadmissible because no evidence Joshua believed death was imminent; he appeared dazed and his injuries were "typical"	Court: Admissible — witnesses’ descriptions of wounds, symptoms, conduct, and loss of responsiveness supported dying-declaration exception
Admission of two police reports	Reports were admissible and largely cumulative of live witness testimony	Admission was hearsay; though no contemporaneous hearsay objection, now contends fundamental error because reports emphasized pain and identification of Hodge	Court: No fundamental error — reports were cumulative of other testimony; any error not so blatant or prejudicial as to deny fair trial
Sufficiency of evidence to prove knowing or intentional murder	State: direct and circumstantial evidence (victim ID, multiple statements, DNA at scene, timing of items) supported inference of knowing/intentional killing	Hodge: DNA and presence at scene do not fix timing; evidence consistent with accident, self-defense, or sudden heat — no proof of intent/knowledge	Court: Sufficient — jury could infer knowing/intentional from victim ID, multiple statements, DNA and circumstantial proof of presence and timing

Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1997) (standard of review for evidentiary rulings)
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (theory behind dying-declaration reliability)
Wright v. State, 916 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (factors trial court may consider to determine belief of imminent death)
Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. 2000) (cumulative evidence not grounds for reversal)
Green v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind. 1992) (murder may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone)
Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind. 1990) (identity and elements may be established by circumstantial evidence)
Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004) (intent/knowledge may be inferred from circumstances)
Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010) (narrow scope of fundamental-error review)