Eva Angelica Lucke v. Andrew Solsvig, 912 F.3d 1084

Eva Lucke, a Hispanic tenant who owns a building on Minot International Airport property, was offered a new lease in Dec. 2015 with an 18‑month initial term and year‑to‑year renewal at $0.30/ft²; a white tenant (Fred Anderson) received identical terms, while PS Properties received longer initial and renewal options.
Lucke sued the City of Minot and the Airport Director under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, Title VI, and the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging racial discrimination in lease terms.
The City explained differing terms by citing (1) the airport’s need for flexibility during redevelopment, (2) concerns about the physical condition of Lucke’s building, and (3) uncertainty whether a hobby shop qualified as an FAA‑approved aeronautical use.
At summary judgment the district court found Lucke failed to identify a properly similarly‑situated comparator and, alternatively, failed to rebut the City’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the lease differences.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo, applied the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial evidence, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment for defendants.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Lucke established a prima facie case by identifying a similarly‑situated comparator who received better terms	Lucke: PS Properties is similarly situated (large permanent building, concrete foundation) and got better lease terms	City: PS Properties differs (multiple leases, different business); Fred Anderson (white) is a valid comparator and got identical terms	Court: Even assuming a prima facie case, Lucke failed to rebut defendants’ reasons; summary judgment affirmed
Whether defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext for racial discrimination	Lucke: City’s concern over her business use is unjustified and therefore pretextual	City: Provided three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (redevelopment flexibility; building condition; FAA aeronautical‑use concerns)	Court: Lucke introduced no evidence undermining these reasons or raising genuine doubt of discriminatory motive; reasons accepted as legitimate; no pretext shown

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (framework for burden shifting in circumstantial discrimination cases)
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (defendant must articulate clear, reasonably specific legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons)
Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2014) (use of McDonnell Douglas framework for racial‑discrimination proof)
Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff need only produce enough admissible evidence to raise genuine doubt as to employer motive at summary judgment)
White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (methods for proving pretext include discrediting proffered reasons or showing discriminatory motive more likely)
Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2005) (definition of ‘‘similarly situated’’ in land‑use context)