Eugene Baker v. Loretta E. Lynch
669 F. App'x 835
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Eugene Baker, convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense, sued seeking to invalidate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) as violating the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
- § 922(g)(9) bars firearm possession by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
- Defendants filed status briefs and asked the district court to treat them as a motion to dismiss; the district court gave Baker notice and an opportunity to oppose in writing.
- The district court dismissed Baker’s first amended complaint with prejudice; Baker appealed.
- Baker’s factual/alleged circumstances were not meaningfully different from the facts in United States v. Chovan, where § 922(g)(9) was upheld.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment (facial / as-applied) | § 922(g)(9) unlawfully prohibits Baker from possessing firearms despite his circumstances | § 922(g)(9) is constitutional under intermediate scrutiny to prevent domestic violence | Court affirmed dismissal; Chovan controls and upheld § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny |
| Whether § 922(g)(9) violates Equal Protection | Statute discriminatorily burdens Baker without sufficient justification | Law is rationally related to preventing domestic gun violence; Baker is not a protected class | Dismissed: rational-basis review applies and statute is rationally related to legitimate purpose |
| Whether the district court erred by construing briefs as a motion to dismiss | Baker contends procedure may have limited his arguments | Defendants requested treatment as a motion; court gave notice and opportunity to respond | No error: Baker had notice and a chance to file opposition; no prejudice shown |
| Whether dismissal with prejudice (no leave to amend) was proper | Baker sought leave to amend but could not identify new facts differentiating his claim from Chovan | Defendants argued amendment would be futile | Affirmed: denial of leave to amend not an abuse of discretion because amendment would be futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court may dismiss sua sponte if plaintiff given notice and opportunity to respond)
- Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)
- United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny against facial and as-applied challenges)
- Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (discussing when rational-basis review applies to Second Amendment-related equal protection claims)
- Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2016) (review standard for denial of leave to amend)
- Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) (amendments should be allowed unless futile)