Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994

Jurors submitted a sixth jury note during deliberations on attempted armed robbery; note content asked whether acts could target a broader class or earlier interactions, and how to relate to the indictment.
The note was received by the courtroom clerk and allegedly answered by the clerk or implicitly by referencing prior instructions, without notifying the defendant or his counsel.
No party recalls being informed of the note or any court response, and the presiding judge was unavailable when the note was addressed.
Rule 10(c) proceedings were used post hoc to supplement the record; the court issued a Statement of Evidence concluding the note was answered and the jury was told to rely on prior instructions, but there was no record of a judge addressing the note.
Appellate hearings (Rule 10(c)) found the record adequate for meaningful review and showed the clerk likely answered the note without counsel present.
The court reversed all convictions except CPWL and remanded for a new trial due to the constitutional violation; CPWL conviction was affirmed after resolving remaining issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the supplemented record adequate for review?	Euceda argues the record is inadequate under Workcuff.	Government argues Rule 10(c) suffices for meaningful review.	Yes; the record is adequate for meaningful review.
Did the trial court's handling of the jury note violate the defendant's right to presence of counsel at all critical stages?	McCoy/Winsock-like the right to presence was violated by ex parte jury communication.	Response was appropriate or harmless; no Sixth Amendment violation.	Yes; violation occurred and was constitutional in dimension.
Was the juror-note handling harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?	Error prejudiced the defendant by failing to provide concrete, targeted guidance.	Substantive guidance was provided (instructions already given); harmless.	No; not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions reversed except CPWL.

United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739 (D.C.Cir.1970) (presence of defense counsel at all critical stages; McCoy cited for absence of counsel principle)
Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519 (D.C.1981) (right to be informed of jury communications and respond before court acts)
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (U.S.1946) (requirement that jury be given concrete, accurate guidance on key issues)
Gagnon v. United States, 470 U.S. 522 (U.S.1985) (right to presence at stages where due process and confrontation are implicated)
Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (U.S.1983) (ex parte communications implicate right to personal presence and counsel)
Alcindore v. United States, 818 A.2d 152 (D.C.2003) (relevance to reinstruction and prejudice under Alcindore analysis)
Workcuff v. United States, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C.Cir.1970) (per se reversal avoided; missing transcript requires harmlessness analysis unless crucial stage)
Van Dyke v. United States, 27 A.3d 1114 (D.C.2011) (ex parte communications and harmless error standards in context of Rule 43)
Hallmon v. United States, 722 A.2d 26 (D.C.1998) (clerks’ responses to routine requests; discussion of harmlessness)