Estrada-Hernandez v. Lynch
819 F.3d 324
7th Cir.2016Background
- Julio Estrada-Hernandez, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. as a child, became an LPR in 1989, but did not acquire citizenship when his mother naturalized.
- Over 15 years he was convicted of multiple state crimes: three controlled-substance offenses (cocaine possession), two retail thefts, and felon-in-possession of a firearm.
- DHS/ICE initiated removal proceedings in 2015 charging removability for controlled-substance offenses, an aggravated felony arising from a firearm conviction, a firearm offense, and two or more crimes involving moral turpitude.
- At the merits hearing the IJ informed Estrada-Hernandez of his right to counsel, offered continuances to obtain counsel multiple times, and Estrada-Hernandez knowingly declined and proceeded pro se, admitting to the convictions.
- After the IJ ordered removal, Estrada-Hernandez obtained counsel and appealed to the BIA arguing denial of the right to counsel, that adjustment of status did not constitute an "admission" for aggravated-felony removal, and that the felon-in-possession conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The BIA denied relief; the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IJ denied due process by accepting admissions while Estrada-Hernandez was unrepresented | IJ coerced/ discouraged him from getting counsel; admissions shifted burden to him | IJ informed him of right to counsel, offered continuances, he waived counsel and the government produced independent evidence | No due-process violation; waivers were knowing and government supported charges |
| Whether adjustment of status counts as an "admission" for 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) aggravated-felony removability | Adjustment after unlawful entry is not an "admission," so § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply | Adjustment of status is an admission because it is the first lawful admission into the U.S. | Adjustment of status is an admission; aggravated-felony ground applies |
| Whether state felon-in-possession conviction is an aggravated felony for removal | Predicate state felony punishable by "one year or more" (not "more than one year") means it does not match federal felony definition, so not an aggravated felony | The Illinois felon-in-possession offense qualifies as an aggravated felony for immigration purposes; controlling precedent supports this | Conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony; BIA decision affirmed |
| Whether IJ shifted burden of proof by eliciting admissions | Admissions coerced burden shift onto respondent, violating statutory or due-process protections | Government submitted independent evidence for each charged conviction; admissions unnecessary to sustain removability | No improper burden shifting; evidence supported charges regardless of admissions |
Key Cases Cited
- Negrete-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.) (state felon-in-possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for immigration removal)
- Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668 (7th Cir.) (adjustment of status can constitute an admission for § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); context matters in statutory "admission" interpretation)
- Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523 (7th Cir.) (removal proceedings are civil; Sixth Amendment criminal-counsel right does not apply)
- Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498 (7th Cir.) (due process applies in removal proceedings and statutory notice of right to counsel suffices for waiver)
- Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.) (statutory right to counsel in immigration hearings requires opportunity to obtain a lawyer but is not equivalent to criminal Sixth Amendment right)