530 F.Supp.3d 695
W.D. Ky.2021Background
- Plaintiffs (residents and estates) sued LP Columbia KY, LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare at Summit Manor and Signature Healthcare, LLC in Adair Circuit Court alleging negligence, KRS 216.515 violations, negligence per se, wrongful death, and breach of contract after several residents contracted COVID-19 (some died).
- Defendants removed to federal court invoking federal-question jurisdiction based on the PREP Act and moved to dismiss or compel arbitration; plaintiffs moved to remand to state court.
- Central legal question: whether the PREP Act (42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d) (1) completely preempts state-law claims, converting them into federal claims removable to federal court, or (2) presents a substantial federal question under Grable.
- The PREP Act provides broad immunity for covered persons for claims "caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from" covered countermeasures, creates an HHS-administered compensation process, and carves out an exclusive federal cause of action only for willful misconduct (with special procedures and D.C. jurisdiction).
- The court concluded the PREP Act supplies an immunity/administrative scheme but does not create an exclusive federal cause of action for ordinary (non-willful) claims and thus is a federal defense rather than a complete preemption basis for removal.
- Result: Plaintiffs’ motion to remand granted; case remanded to state court. Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for oral argument denied; other procedural motions granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Complete preemption by PREP Act | PREP Act is a defense; does not create federal cause of action | PREP Act wholly preempts state claims and provides exclusive federal remedy (removal proper) | PREP Act does not completely preempt ordinary state-law claims; removal improper |
| Availability of federal forum under PREP Act | State claims do not necessarily raise federal issues; PREP Act is an immunity defense | Uniform federal interpretation and HHS declaration support federal adjudication | PREP Act issues are defensive; no substantial federal-question obligating federal forum |
| Agency guidance / Advisory Opinion deference | Advisory Opinion is not binding and expressly lacks force of law | HHS Advisory Opinions and Declarations support preemption and jurisdiction (invoke Chevron/Skidmore) | Advisory Opinion not entitled to controlling Chevron weight here; unpersuasive on complete preemption |
| Dismissal / other procedures | Plaintiffs sought remand; did not allege willful misconduct | Defendants sought dismissal/compel arbitration based on PREP Act immunity | Court denied dismissal and compelled remand so defendants may assert PREP Act defenses in state court |
Key Cases Cited
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule limits removal to federal questions appearing on complaint face)
- Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (distinguishes ordinary preemption from complete preemption doctrine)
- Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (sets Sixth Circuit framework/limits for preemption and artful-pleading exceptions)
- Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mf’g, 545 U.S. 308 (2005) (substantial federal-question doctrine for federal jurisdiction)
- Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (federal statutory issue in defense does not automatically confer federal jurisdiction)
- Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 78 F.3d 256 (6th Cir. 1996) (administrative remedies do not necessarily produce complete preemption)
- Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 1995) (distinguishes ordinary preemption as a federal defense from complete preemption)
- Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998) (preemption extinguishes state claim but does not transform it into a federal claim for removal)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (weight of agency interpretations depends on their persuasiveness)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Chevron deference principles; not all agency interpretations receive controlling deference)