506 F.Supp.3d 104
D. Mass.2020Background:
- On June 2, 2015, FBI SA John Doe 1 and Boston Detective John Doe 2 (members of a JTTF) shot and killed Usaamah Abdullah Rahim; Rahim’s estate (through Rahimah Rahim) sued under Bivens and brought state-law tort claims and an FTCA claim against the United States.
- No discovery had occurred when Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and reasonableness of force; they relied on officer declarations, a District Attorney’s report, call recordings, surveillance video, and a recovered knife photo.
- Plaintiff opposed and filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit asking for limited discovery (chiefly depositions of the officers and evidence-gathering) to test the officers’ untested affidavits and the factual narrative in the DA report.
- The court excluded the District Attorney’s Report as inadmissible hearsay to prove underlying facts and held that untested officer affidavits could not be credited on summary judgment without giving Plaintiff an opportunity to depose the affiants.
- Drawing all reasonable inferences for Plaintiff, the court found genuine factual disputes about whether officers created the need for deadly force and whether nonlethal alternatives were feasible; it denied Defendants’ summary judgment motions without prejudice and ordered limited discovery.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers used excessive (deadly) force in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Bivens) | Rahim’s estate: officers approached him in plain clothes with guns drawn, did not adequately identify themselves, and their planning/approach made deadly force unnecessary and unreasonable | Officers: had information Rahim was armed with a knife, ordered him to drop a weapon, and faced a split-second threat justifying lethal force | Court: factual disputes exist about the lead-up and context; summary judgment on excessive force is premature pending discovery |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity | Rahim’s estate: even if force occurred, it violated clearly established rights because deadly force is unreasonable unless suspect poses immediate threat | Defendants: their conduct was objectively reasonable and not contrary to clearly established law | Court: cannot decide immunity now because factual record is incomplete; must assess reasonableness in full context after discovery |
| Whether Defendants may rely on the District Attorney’s report and untested officer affidavits on summary judgment | Rahim’s estate: DA report is hearsay; officer affidavits are untested and Plaintiff must be allowed to depose affiants before they are credited | Defendants: report and affidavits are admissible / Plaint iff had no affirmative evidence officers lied and summary judgment may proceed | Held: DA report excluded; un-deposed officer affidavits cannot be relied on—Plaintiff entitled to targeted discovery (depositions) before ruling |
| Whether the FTCA negligence claim is barred by the discretionary function exception | Rahim’s estate: negligence arises from operational decisions that may have been unconstitutional or unreasonable, so exception may not apply | United States: planning and operational choices were discretionary and policy-driven, so immunity under §2680(a) applies | Court: resolution depends on whether Plaintiff can prove constitutional violation; summary judgment on discretionary-function defense is premature |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implied damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officers)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard for excessive-force claims)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permissible only if suspect poses immediate threat; warning when feasible)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework; importance of early resolution)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute standard and summary judgment's fit with discovery)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (courts must view summary-judgment record in light most favorable to nonmovant; beware of misstating facts)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (qualified-immunity precedent must be specific; caution against defining clearly established law at high generality)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (Fourth Amendment specificity requirement in qualified-immunity analysis)
- McKenney v. Mangino, 873 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2017) (deadly force reasonable only when suspect poses immediate threat)