Estate of Saylor v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.
54 F. Supp. 3d 409
D. Maryland2014Background
- Robert Ethan Saylor, a 26-year-old man with Down Syndrome (IQ ≈ 40), returned to a Regal movie showing a second time; his caregiver, Mary Crosby, told theater staff he should be left alone and that he would resist being touched.
- Theater management asked an off-duty Frederick County deputy (later joined by two other off‑duty deputies working mall security) to remove Saylor for not purchasing a second ticket.
- Deputies confronted Saylor in the theater; a struggle ensued, Saylor was handcuffed, became injured (fractured larynx), emergency services were called, and Saylor died of asphyxiation.
- Plaintiffs (Saylor’s parents and estate) sued: the three deputies (individual § 1983 excessive‑force and state tort claims), the State of Maryland (Title II ADA failure‑to‑train and vicarious liability; sovereign immunity defenses), and Regal Cinemas (state negligence and gross negligence claims tied to Title III ADA duties).
- Court refused to convert motions to summary judgment where defendants relied on outside witness statements not integral to the complaint; resolved motions under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Holdings in brief: Deputies’ § 1983 excessive‑force, gross negligence, battery, and wrongful‑death survivor claims survive in part; Deputies’ negligence claim dismissed under MTCA immunity; State’s Title II failure‑to‑train and vicarious Title II liability survive, wrongful‑death claim against State dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds; Regal’s claims dismissed (no Title III damages-based negligence and Regal not a proximate cause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputies used excessive force in violation of § 1983 | Deputiffs used objectively unreasonable force after being warned of Saylor’s disability; death resulted | Deputies: force was reasonable given refusal to leave and resistance; segmented analysis of events justified force | Court: plausible Fourth Amendment violation at pleading stage — claim survives; qualified immunity denied at this stage |
| Whether deputies entitled to MTCA immunity for state‑law negligence, gross negligence, battery | Plaintiffs: deputies acted outside public‑duty scope or with malice/gross negligence | Deputies: acts were within public duties and entitled to immunity; no malice/gross negligence | Negligence claim dismissed (MTCA immunity). Gross negligence and battery survive (malice/gross‑negligence pled sufficiently) |
| Whether State liable under Title II ADA for failure to train and vicariously for deputies’ conduct | Plaintiffs: State failed to train deputies to deal with developmental disabilities; this both wrongfully arrested and failed to accommodate Saylor | State: Fourth Circuit hasn’t recognized ADA failure‑to‑train; existing policies suffice; Eleventh Amendment bars tort claims in federal court | Court: Title II failure‑to‑train and vicarious liability plausibly alleged — those claims survive; wrongful‑death claim against State dismissed on sovereign immunity; damages may be available under deliberate‑indifference standard |
| Whether Regal liable in negligence/gross negligence based on Title III duties and proximate causation | Plaintiffs: Regal failed to modify policy or permit accommodation (wait/pay) and asked deputies to remove Saylor — statutory breach supports negligence | Regal: Title III does not provide private money‑damages remedy; any ADA standards are not public‑safety statutes here; Regal’s request to deputies not proximate cause of death | Court: Title III cannot be the basis for private damages negligence here; Regal’s conduct not a proximate cause; negligence and gross negligence claims against Regal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Graham factors govern objective‑reasonableness of force)
- Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 1994) (officer force must be viewed in full context; similar facts supported denial of immunity)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified‑immunity two‑step and flexibility in sequencing)
- Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474 (4th Cir. 2005) (elements of a Title II ADA claim)
- Waller v. City of Danville, 556 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2009) (Title II applied to arrests; discussion of reasonable accommodation and training)
- Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs Frederick Cnty., 673 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2012) (ADA Title II considerations for effective communication/accommodation)
- Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218 (Md. 2009) (Maryland proximate‑cause analysis; substantial‑factor and superseding cause principles)