Estate Of: Randall J. Langeland. Janell Boone, App. / X-res. v. Sharon Drown, Res. / X-app.
195 Wash. App. 74
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Randall Langeland and Sharon Drown lived in a committed intimate relationship (CIR) from 1991 until Langeland’s death in 2009; they acquired a house, sailboat, business assets, vehicles, and bank accounts during the CIR.
- After Langeland died intestate, his daughter Janell Boone (administrator) and Drown disputed ownership of assets; trial court initially awarded Drown half of listed jointly claimed property and 24.7% of the house proceeds.
- This court previously held on appeal that property acquired during a CIR is presumptively joint property and that Boone failed as a matter of law to rebut that presumption for the house, sailboat, and business; matter was remanded.
- On remand the trial court treated contested assets as joint property, awarded most of the estate’s half of joint assets to Drown, and vacated a prior $70,000 fee award against Drown; the court awarded Drown $9,187 for defending Boone’s motion to reconsider.
- Helsell Fetterman LLP (Boone’s counsel) had withdrawn approximately $101,498.82 from the court registry pursuant to a clerk order reflecting a fee award; this court vacated the fee award on the first appeal and Drown sought restitution of withdrawn funds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Boone) | Defendant's Argument (Drown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the law of the case bars Boone from arguing a separate-property agreement or house contract | Court of Appeals only decided presumption and tracing; separate-property/house agreement not addressed on first appeal, so Boone may raise it | Prior appellate decision disposed of contested-asset ownership; law of the case precludes relitigation | Law of the case applies; Boone cannot relitigate those issues (court rejects her separate-property/house-contract claims) |
| Whether the trial court improperly awarded Langeland’s separate property to Drown | Trial court lacked authority because separate property is not divisible as joint property after death | Trial court awarded only joint property; award was within equitable-distribution power | Trial court did not award Langeland’s separate property; equitable division of joint property was proper |
| Whether the trial court erred by failing to include property titled to Drown in the equitable division | Boone argues trial court should have considered Drown-held jointly acquired assets | Drown notes Boone prepared the estate inventory and did not raise omissions earlier | Court declines to consider this new challenge on second appeal because Boone failed to raise it below and on first appeal |
| Whether Helsell Fetterman must return registry funds (restitution) after fee award was vacated | Boone and trial court relied on order and claimed registry payment was proper or administrative; trial court denied restitution | Drown seeks restitution for withdrawn registry funds that largely belonged to her after reversal | Trial court abused discretion in denying restitution; appellate court reverses and remands for entry of judgment for Drown; appellate attorney fees awarded to Drown |
Key Cases Cited
- Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339 (Wash. 1995) (treats CIR joint property analogous to community property principles)
- Olver v. Fowler, 161 Wn.2d 655 (Wash. 2007) (limits equitable distribution and explains separate property exceptions)
- In re Estate of Langeland, 177 Wn. App. 315 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (prior appellate decision holding Boone failed to rebut joint-property presumption for contested assets)
- Ehsani v. McCullough Family P’ship, 160 Wn.2d 586 (Wash. 2007) (limits restitution against attorneys who received judgment proceeds under preexisting agreement)
- In re Marriage of Mason, 48 Wn. App. 688 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (attorney paid under statutory scheme may be liable in restitution when judgment reversed)
- Arzola v. Name Intelligence, Inc., 188 Wn. App. 588 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (awarding restitution where trial court erroneously granted statutory fees later reversed)