Estate of Myroslava Kotsovska v. Saul Liebman (073861)
116 A.3d 1
N.J.2015Background
- In Sept. 2008 decedent moved in to provide live-in caretaker services to defendant Liebman for $100/day; arrangement was informal, terminable at will, paid in cash, and undocumented.
- About a month into the arrangement Liebman accidentally struck and fatally injured decedent; Liebman conceded negligence.
- Petitioner (decedent’s estate) sued in Superior Court for wrongful death, asserting decedent was an independent contractor; Liebman raised the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) exclusive-remedy defense, contending decedent was an employee.
- Trial court refused to transfer to the Division of Workers’ Compensation or dismiss; the case went to jury which found decedent was an independent contractor and awarded damages.
- Appellate Division reversed, holding the Division had primary jurisdiction and that the jury charge was deficient; Supreme Court granted certification.
- Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated the jury verdict, and adopted a hybrid (Pukowsky/D’Annunzio) test for worker status under social legislation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Superior Court is divested of jurisdiction to decide worker status once defendant raises WCA exclusive-remedy defense | Kotsovska: Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction when plaintiff files only in Law Division and disputes employee status; no petition was filed in Division | Liebman: WCA presumes acceptance by employment contracts and Division has primary/exclusive jurisdiction to decide employment status | Held: Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction to resolve employment-status threshold when plaintiff elects Superior Court and no WCA petition is pending before Division |
| Whether trial court should have transferred matter to Division under primary-jurisdiction doctrine | Kotsovska: No transfer necessary; Division not better positioned and no claim pending there | Liebman: Primary jurisdiction applies because employment-status is an employment issue best resolved by Division | Held: Trial court did not abuse discretion in declining to transfer; primary jurisdiction not applicable here given facts |
| Proper legal test to distinguish employee vs. independent contractor for WCA purposes | Kotsovska: Trial court’s Model Jury Charge was sufficient; may need clarification | Liebman: Model Agency charge is inadequate for social-legislation context; should emphasize economic-dependence factors | Held: Adopted hybrid test (control + economic-dependence/functional-integration) as in Pukowsky/D’Annunzio for Compensation Act cases |
| Whether jury charge was so deficient as to require reversal | Kotsovska: Charge tracked Model Jury Charge and permitted jury to weigh factors | Liebman: Charge omitted or de-emphasized key Pukowsky/D’Annunzio factors (economic dependence, integration) and misled jury | Held: Charge was imperfect but omissions either favored plaintiff or were irrelevant under the facts; not clearly capable of producing unjust result—no reversal |
Key Cases Cited
- Kristiansen v. Morgan, 153 N.J. 298 (1998) (addresses forum for compensability disputes and primary jurisdiction issues)
- Wunschel v. City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651 (1984) (recognizes Compensation Court as forum best suited to decide employment/compensability issues)
- D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110 (2007) (endorses hybrid approach—control, economic dependence, functional integration—for social-legislation worker-status analysis)
- Pukowsky v. Caruso, 312 N.J. Super. 171 (App. Div. 1998) (articulates twelve-factor hybrid test used to assess employee vs. independent-contractor status)